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Inherent tensions in the financial sector mean that episodes of extreme
stress are inevitable, if unpredictable. This is true even when financial
regulatory and supervisory regimes are effective in many respects. The
government's capacity to intervene may determine whether distress is confined
to the financial sector or breaks out into the real economy Although adequate
resolution authority to address a failingfinancial firm is a necessary objective
of the current regulatory reforms, a firm-by-firm approach cannot address a
major systemic failure. Major blows to the financial system, such as the
financial crisis of 2007-2009, may require capital support of the financial
sector to prevent severe economic harm. We therefore propose the creation of a
Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund ("SEIF" or "Fund"), initially set at $1
trillion, but periodically rescaled to the size of the U.S. economy. SEIF should
be funded (and partially pre-funded) by risk-adjusted assessments on all large
financial firms -including hedge funds -that benefit from systemic stability.
The Department of the Treasury ("Treasury") would administer the Fund, the
use of which would be triggered by a "triple key" concurrence among the
Treasury, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), and the
Federal Reserve ("Fed"). Unlike taxpayer "bailouts, " such a fund would
mutualize systemic risk among financial firms through a facility overseen by
regulators. Moreover, its funding mechanism would give financial firms a
greater incentive to warn regulators of growing systemic risk. And this standby
emergency authority would avoid the need for high-stakes legislative action
mid-crisis, which can be destabilizing even ifsuccessful and catastrophic if not.
Such an approach is superior to the financial sector nationalization strategy
embodied in the newly enacted Dodd-Frank financial reform bill.
t Jeffrey N. Gordon is the Alfred W. Bressler Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Law
and Economic Studies at Columbia Law School and a Fellow of the European Corporate Governance
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American Law and Economic Association; and members of the Corporate Law Reading Group at
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Introduction
The ambition of the newly enacted financial regulation reform legislation
("Dodd-Frank")' is to minimize the probability of financial sector distress by
creating regulatory and market structures for financial derivatives, empowering
regulators to impose higher capital requirements and additional conduct
restraints on large financial firms, and establishing systemic risk monitoring
and intervention authority. The legislation's heart concerns the resolution of
failing nonbank financial firms. Its goal is to create better options than the Fed
and the Treasury had during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 when they
resolved failing firms such as Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and
1. The legislation is more formally known as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and




Citigroup. Instead of bankruptcy or bailout, Dodd-Frank offers an FDIC
receivership that would amount to a controlled liquidation-a winding up of
the failing firm rather than a reorganization or rescue. A major difference from
bankruptcy is that the FDIC can now provide operating capital to keep the firm
afloat pending liquidation in order to prevent shockwaves from a Lehman-like
sudden collapse. Unsecured creditors will bear losses to the extent that asset
values are less than the firm's liabilities, and the shareholders will be paid last.
But Dodd-Frank not only substitutes FDIC receivership for bankruptcy, it also
makes receivership the only way to assist a large, troubled financial firm. The
legislation both strips the Fed of the power to make emergency loans to a
specific firm and eliminates the FDIC's emergency loan guarantee authority.
Dodd-Frank also precludes anything-like the Troubled Asset Relief Program
("TARP") II-that would give the Treasury power to inject capital into the
financial sector.
This resolution straitjacket is a prescription for disaster. In an effort to
avoid "moral hazard" and ensure that none of those terrible "bailouts" happen,
the legislation significantly limits regulators' authority to intervene in a
financial emergency. Dodd-Frank offers only one real option: a cascade of
receiverships imposed on large U.S. financial firms. The result would be the
nationalization of the financial sector, an untested and potentially destabilizing
intervention, the mere threat of which could hasten a slide from financial
instability into financial emergency. This resolution strategy has been chosen
without apparent reflection on its potentially destabilizing impact on the
international financial system, as demonstrated by the way U.S. and U.K.
resolution discontinuities exacerbated the systemic distress caused by the
Lehman bankruptcy. Moreover, the international impact of financial sector
nationalization would be much aggravated by multiple close-in-time
receiverships. This "nuclear option" thus in place, Dodd-Frank seems to
assume that if we set the incentives right, the self-interest of private actors will
so moderate risk-taking by financial firms that systemic failures will never
happen.
History suggests otherwise: major systemic distress is inevitable over
time. The Dodd-Frank nuclear option is simply too dangerous. Therefore, we
think regulators need standby emergency authority, supported by a "Systemic
Emergency Insurance Fund" ("SEIF" or "Fund"), to prevent either financial
sector nationalization or desperate mid-crisis pleas to Congress that shake
economic confidence (if acceded to), and lead to economic catastrophe (if not).
The problem is that while greater risk of creditor losses may well reduce
risk-taking at many firms, improving incentives does not assure that all parties
will correctly calculate risks so as to avoid systemic financial crises. Barring
regulatory omniscience, the interactions of financial innovation and globalizing
capital flows will outstrip the calculative powers of even conservative parties,
let alone major players in an industry necessarily fueled by risk-taking. As
demonstrated by the heated debates over the causes of the recent financial
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crisis, it will be impossible to guarantee the safety of a complex financial
system operating on global scale. The result? The failure of any systemically
important firm will be a shock. The receivership of a large firm, even if well
managed, will roil markets domestically and internationally. It could well result
in an immediate fall in asset values, meaning that anticipated creditor losses in
a "liquidating" resolution would be very large. Some of the creditors may be
systemically important themselves (like money market funds or insurance
companies), and their capital suppliers may decide to cash in immediately
rather than bear the risk of subsequent loss.
The failure of a large financial firm may threaten others both because
financial firms are interlinked and because firms following similar business
strategies are likely to sink together. As in the recent financial crisis,
uncertainty about the creditworthiness of many financial firms will be
debilitating. As an approach, firm-by-firm resolution fails in such a crisis; it
will produce a series of falling dominos. This cascade is accelerated by creditor
uncertainty about the "haircut" that follows a controlled liquidation. The Dodd-
Frank response is to "put them all in receivership." The practical effect of this
response would be to nationalize a large part of the financial sector, which may
be a highly destabilizing outcome. In short, Dodd-Frank provides a valuable
mechanism to "resolve" a failing financial firm. It does not provide a
satisfactory mechanism to "resolve" a financial crisis.
What is the alternative? To be sure, FDIC resolution authority and the risk
of significant creditor losses are critical elements of any effective strategy. In
ordinary times, FDIC resolution of a failing financial firm should be the
exclusive approach. But in the event of a genuine financial emergency, the
Treasury should have the option of using SEIF to protect the entire financial
system by providing temporary capital injections to an array of threatened
financial firms. The funding mechanism must be designed to make clear that
this is not a "taxpayer bailout" but rather an insurance fund designed to force
the financial sector to internalize the costs of financial distress. There are two
important elements of this insurance fund. First, it should be funded, indeed
pre-funded, by risk-adjusted premiums charged to financial firms. The analogy,
of course, is to the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund, which is designed to
protect the banking system against systemic risk and only incidentally protects
depositors. With the growth of nonbank financial intermediaries like money
market funds and the commercial paper market-the so-called "shadow
banking" system-we need to broaden this concept. Second, all large financial
firms, including hedge funds and money market funds, should pay premiums
because they benefit from systemic stability. Moreover, their potential exposure
to insurance fund losses will give them a greater incentive to warn regulators of
systemically dangerous risk-taking.
Appropriate risk-limiting regulation and supervisory oversight are surely
important to reduce the likelihood of systemic crisis, but we need to anticipate




economic catastrophe. The proposed SEIF requires large financial firms to
mutually self-insure against outbreaks of systemic distress, and it gives
regulators the power to tailor their intervention.
Part I of this Article argues that systemic crises are inevitable,
notwithstanding good faith regulatory efforts to avoid them. The recurrence of
financial crises throughout history can be explained in at least four different but
nonexclusive ways. The first is the inherent fragility of banks (and their
nonbank substitutes), given their liquidity promise to their capital suppliers and
the illiquid nature of their assets. The second is the inherent instability of a
capitalist financial system, which has a strongly pro-cyclical bias tending
toward asset bubbles and increased leverage. The third is the potential that the
systemic risks posed by any given financial innovation will, over the course of
its evolution, unforeseeably flip from the minor to the major. A fourth
explanation cuts across all of these accounts: regulators have a constrained
capacity, in light of gaps in human cognition and pro-cyclical political
economy pressures, to foresee systemic risks and cabin them. Moreover, even
successful control of systemic risk is paradoxically risk-creating, as it causes
parties to rely on a benign financial environment. Thus, systemic breaks in the
financial sector are inevitable.
Part II argues that the ongoing restructuring of U.S. financial sector
regulation must incorporate two elements to confront the risks posed by
systemic breaks. The first element is resolution authority over failing nonbank
financial institutions similar in breadth to the FDIC's resolution authority over
failing banks. Regulators need better resolution options to address failing firms
like Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Citigroup. While Dodd-Frank
provided new resolution authority, it did not address the second element: the
ability to confront systemic breaks with standby emergency authority, and
specifically, a SEIF for the Treasury's use in appropriate circumstances. The
Fund must be available for three purposes: 1) to provide capital support for
particular receivership plans; 2) to provide capital and other assistance to
financial firms; and 3) to support emergency credit facilities created by the
Federal Reserve (and the FDIC) to preserve financial stability. To be effective,
the Fund needs to be scaled to the size of the economy and the financial sector.
The initial fund should be $1 trillion, indexed to an appropriate measure of
financial sector growth. The Fund should be partly pre-funded by risk-adjusted
fees charged to large or systemically important financial firms. To fully
mutualize risk within the financial sector, losses beyond the initial fund should
be recovered via similarly allocated assessments.
To be clear, recourse to SEIF should be available only in the event of a
genuine systemic emergency and not for the nonemergency resolution of failing
financial institutions. The goal is to avoid a cascade of financial sector failures
that will severely disrupt the real economy, without nationalizing the financial
sector. To address legitimacy and accountability concerns, we propose a "triple
key" approach to use of this authority, which would require the concurrence of
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the Fed (reflected in a Board of Governors' vote), the Secretary of the Treasury
(necessary for the Treasury's commitment of funds), and the FDIC (in light of
its assigned role in nonbank resolutions), along with notification of and
consultation with the appropriate House and Senate committees. We also
contemplate that this authority would be subject to monitoring (as provided for
in Dodd-Frank) and review through congressional hearings.2
Part III discusses what we take to be the main objection to our proposal:
that the availability of such a Fund will increase "moral hazard" and thereby
increase the likelihood of systemic distress. Moral hazard comes in two forms.
"Micro" moral hazard operates at the level of individuals and firms and is over-
emphasized as a cause of financial crises. Individual firms should be allowed to
fail-meaning significant losses for employees, shareholders, and unsecured
creditors-in a regime with appropriate resolution authority. No single firm
should be "too big to fail," and SEIF does not disrupt the constraints on firm-
specific moral hazard. Parties are unlikely to calculate that SEIF would be
casually used, so firm-specific risks remain real. "Macro" moral hazard is
based on a belief that the government will prevent financial sector collapse and
may well contribute to overall risk-taking by reducing incentives for diversified
credit suppliers to insist on risk moderation. But the non-SEIF alternative-
extensive capital supplier losses from the imposition of receiverships across the
entire financial sector-carries two serious consequences. First, in anticipation
of serial receiverships, 'capital suppliers will respond adversely earlier in the
path between "financial instability" and "financial crisis." At a minimum, their
response will raise the cost of capital; it may also produce a liquidity meltdown.
Either way, the result makes a financial crisis more likely. Second, capital
suppliers will reduce their investment in the financial sector, even during
periods of financial stability. This is likely to increase the cost of debt and
could reduce economic growth. In other words, we are better off if the relevant
parties believe that the government will protect the financial sector rather than
nationalize it or abandon it in a crisis. SEIF will provide that assurance.
Moreover, the industry funding mechanism that we propose for SEIF will give
sophisticated parties incentives to alert regulators about increases in systemic
risk and unwise risk-taking by systemically important firms. Since premiums
will be risk-adjusted, parties will also have incentives to blow the whistle on
firms that are underpaying.
2. We also favor restoration of the FDIC's debt guarantee authority, subject to the same "triple
key" approval procedure and follow-on accountability mechanisms we propose for SEIF. See infra text
accompanying notes 156-164. In the case of both SEIF and FDIC guarantees, the Treasury should
receive appropriate compensation from the recipient firms-whether in fees, stock warrants, or both. We
also favor reversal of the provision in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act that strips the
Treasury of the authority to use the Exchange Stabilization Fund to guarantee money market fund
obligations, provided appropriate fees are collected. See infra text accompanying notes 171-172. To strip





Financial emergencies are no less a threat to the nation's well being than
other contingencies for which Congress has granted emergency authority. To
object "on principle" that emergency financial assistance authority encourages
risk-taking or rewards unworthy recipients ignores the consequences for third
parties in the real economy. For example, TARP's capital infusions were a
critical and cost-effective intervention in resolving the financial crisis.' TARP's
capital infusions provided an important interval in which financial firms could
find additional private capital. The government intervention to stave off the
failure of large financial firms also stabilized the real economy because it gave
nonfinancial firms assurances that investments in production were likely to pay
off. We think much of the objection to TARP arose because its funds came
directly from taxpayers and appeared to allow the financial sector to internalize
profits and socialize risk. An emergency insurance fund, like SEIF, funded by
the financial sector (especially if pre-funded) but deployed by regulators,
should adequately address this objection.
I. The Inevitability of Systemic Crisis
Since long before the recent financial crisis, a cottage industry of
economic historians has documented and attempted to explain the historical
recurrence of systemic financial crises.4 Three general accounts shake out of
this literature, each focusing on different sources of financial instability at
3. The TARP program authorized disbursements of up to $700 billion for a wide array of
programs supporting the financial sector and the parties harmed by the financial crisis. As of October
2010, the Treasury expected total disbursements of approximately $475 billion and costs of $50 billion.
One-third of these costs are related to support for the auto industry, especially General Motors. U.S.
DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: Two YEAR RETROSPECTIVE i, 3, 48
(2010), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/TARP%2Two%2Year/20Retrospective
10%2005%2010_transmittal%201etter.pdf.
A recent report on the effectiveness of financial and fiscal policies at mitigating economic fallout
from the financial crisis concludes that financial policies, including TARP, were particularly important.
ALAN S. BLINDER & MARK ZANDI, HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END (2010),
available at http://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/End-of-Great-Recession.pdf With an
exclusively fiscal response (that is, the stimulus package), the estimated unemployment rate would have
peaked at 12.8% (compared to 10% actual unemployment), a difference of 5 million jobs. Id. at 8 tbl.5.
The authors do not try to disaggregate the effects of TARP and the Fed's various credit programs,
though they say that TARP made the Fed's credit support activities more effective. The authors
conclude that "Ben Bemanke was probably right when he said that '[w]e came very close in October
[2008] to Depression 2.0."' Id. at 7. They observe: "Without [TARP's] equity infusions, the entire
system might have come to a grinding halt." Id.
4. Notable contributions include: CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS,
PANICS AND CRASHES (5th ed. 2005); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS
DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL CRISES (2009); Michael D. Bordo & Antu Panini
Murshid, Are Financial Crises Becoming Increasingly More Contagious? What Is the Historical
Evidence on Contagion?, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CONTAGION: How IT SPREADS AND How IT
CAN BE STOPPED 367 (Kristin Forbes & Stijn Claessens eds., 2001); Michael D. Bordo et al., Is the
Crisis Problem Growing More Severe?, 16 ECON. POL'Y 51 (2001); Charles Goodhart & P.J.R. Delargy,
Financial Crises: Plus ga Change, plus c'est la Mime Chose, I INT'L FIN. 261 (1998); and Larry Neal
& Marc Weidenmier, Crises in the Global Economy from Tulips to Today: Contagion and
Consequences, in GLOBALIZATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 2003).
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varying levels of institutional particularity: in the banking system, in the
financial system as a whole, and in financial innovation. A fourth general
account relates to political economy factors that constrain regulators from
intervening even as a crisis mounts.
A. Inherent Fragility of the Banking System
Banking system fragility derives from three interlocked elements: first, the
inherent fragility of banks; second, the potential dissemination of local distress
to the banking system as a whole; and third, the expandable boundaries of the
banking system.
1. Fragility
Banks (and their nonbank substitutes) are inherently fragile because of the
liquidity mismatch between bank liabilities and bank assets. Banks typically
raise a large fraction of their funds from depositors-holders of checking
accounts, savings accounts, and certificates of deposit-who expect ready
access to their funds. Banks classically use depositors' short-term commitments
to perform a "maturity transformation," lending to consumers and businesses
for long-term investments. Maturity transformation is a profitable business
when the short-term rates paid to depositors are lower than the long-term rates
borrowers are charged. Banks also develop and exploit superiority over public
securities markets when assessing initial creditworthiness, monitoring ongoing
creditor behavior, and addressing changes in the borrower's ability to repay.
Banks customarily maintain only "fractional reserves" to cover depositor
5. This account draws from FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, UNDERSTANDING
FINANCIAL CRISES (2007); MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION (2009); JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, WHY ARE THERE So MANY BANKING
CRISES? THE POLITICS AND POLICY OF BANK REGULATION (2008); and Douglas W. Diamond & Philip
H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983).
6. "Maturity transformation" is the conversion of the short-term liquidity needs of depositors
into long-term funding commitments for borrowers. Banks have traditionally performed this function.
Depositors put funds into checking accounts, savings accounts, and certificates of deposit, which can be
withdrawn from the bank on demand, though perhaps with some notice in the case of savings accounts
and the forfeiture of some interest in the case of CDs. In turn, the bank lends these deposited funds to
borrowers as part of a long-term lending commitment or to fund specific projects or asset purchases.
Regardless, the lending typically takes place on much longer terms. This bank activity thus transforms
short-term liabilities into long-term assets-hence "maturity transformation." Under this arrangement,
the bank will not necessarily have cash immediately available in the event of unexpected depositor
withdrawals. But the bank can borrow money from other financial institutions on the security of its
assets, and in the case of systemic liquidity pressure, can borrow from a lender of last resort like the
Federal Reserve. The process by which the different time horizons of depositors and borrowers are
matched up is at the core of a successful system of financial intermediation. See FINANCIAL SERVICES
AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REViEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 21
(2009) (discussing how the growth of "shadow banking" reflected changes in the forms of maturity
transformation); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Comment Letter to the SEC on Money Market Reform (Columbia
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 352, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1473275.
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withdrawals, relying on the aggregate uncorrelated liquidity needs of their
depositors and a reputation for prudential loan-making that preserves
depositors' ongoing confidence.7
Assume some event disrupts depositor confidence, perhaps a rumor of bad
luck on the lending side that seems to pose some risk that depositor claims will
not be paid in full.8 Suddenly, depositor liquidity demands may become
correlated on the dimension of solvency risk. This run exhibits the dynamics of
a prisoner's dilemma: it is rational to be at the head of the line to withdraw your
money from a bank that might fail. If you think others will run, you want to run
first.
Fragility exists because the run is rational, even if the depositors
individually believe that the bank's assets are worth more than its liabilities,
provided depositors also believe that the contrary view may be widely held. If a
depositor believes that a bank's credit losses have given it a negative net worth
regardless of its assets being sold at fair market values, the depositor wants to
withdraw before the bank's assets are depleted. Alternatively, even if a
depositor believes that the bank's net worth is currently positive, the depositor
may conclude that the rapid disposal of long-term assets to satisfy running
depositors will give the bank a negative net worth. This fire-sale discount is
driven by two factors: first, a "congestion effect" from the unexpected sale
(more technically, from short-term inelasticity of liquidity supply); and second,
asymmetric information: purchasers will offer prices discounted in anticipation
of the bank's rational exploitation of its superior knowledge of asset values.
The bank will be hard pressed in the short timeframe of a liquidity crisis to
credibly demonstrate the assets' high quality.9 Thus, a run can occur even when
the bank would be solvent in the absence of the run.
7. In addition to deposits, banks also fund themselves with an equity capital layer to provide a
cushion against possible credit losses. The ratio of bank assets to equity is a bank's leverage. The
combination of such leverage and the practice of banks holding only a small portion of their assets as
cash or cash equivalents, "fractional reserves," are important sources of bank fragility. Note that the
inherent fragility of banks persists even with full reserves if deposits can be withdrawn on demand but
assets are illiquid. Modem banking regulation both permits fractional reserve banking to enhance the
availability of credit in the economy and controls its extent through reserve requirements that reduce the
risk that the bank will be unable to meet depositor withdrawal demands.
8. Economists differ on whether the crisis initiation can be genuinely random-a "sunspot
equilibrium"--or will invariably be triggered by a macroeconomic event. See Charles W. Calomiris &
Joseph R. Mason, Fundamentals, Panics, and Bank Distress During the Depression, 93 AM. ECON. REV.
1615 (2003). Following a macroeconomic shock, depositors' inability to distinguish a solvent bank from
an insolvent one may trigger a run-a problem of asymmetric information. Charles W. Calomiris &
Gary Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation, in FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 109 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1992). The 1933 bank holiday and the
2009 stress tests of major financial firms thus provided information that depositors and other credit-
suppliers could rely upon to assess firm solvency.
9. Note that this source of fragility will increase with the valuation opacity of the assets that
the bank may want to sell.
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2. Dissemination of Distress
There are two general mechanisms that spread local financial distress to
the broader banking system. The first is "contagion," meaning that the failure
of one bank so significantly increases the solvency risk at other banks through
interbank credit relationships that it triggers a cascading series of runs. The
second is "similarity" (or "commonality"), meaning that depositors learn from
the failure of one bank with a particular asset and liability strategy that
similarly situated banks are at risk. These two primary dissemination
mechanisms are exacerbated by the opacity of counterparty exposures and
financial firm balance sheets. Thus, an important secondary dissemination
mechanism is significant uncertainty about the exposure of particular
institutions to contagion or similarity risks, heightened by banks' inability to
credibly certify that they are not so exposed. All of these mechanisms operated
in the recent financial crisis.
It was commonly stated that Bear Stearns was not "too big to fail," the
general moral hazard objection to government rescues, but "too interconnected
to fail." This is a classic case of contagion risk. Bear Stearns and its peers
throughout the financial sector were tied together through a web of
counterparty relationships-derivatives, financing contracts, and buy/sell
orders-so that a failure by Bear Stearns might cause other financial firms to
not meet their counterparty obligations. Bear Steams's failure was contagious
not because it would necessarily result in another firm's failure but because it
could probabilistically result in a failure. All it takes to trigger a run is the
necessary quantum of uncertainty. 10
Even though Bear Stearns was rescued through a Fed-supported merger
with JPMorgan Chase, its failure provided information to market participants
about the high solvency risk at firms whose business models depended on
holding or underwriting large numbers of mortgage-backed securities
("MBSs"). Similar strategies would, at least theoretically, fail in common.
Thus, an important reason the crisis soon engulfed Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch, and Citigroup was "similarity" (or "commonality"). Like Bear Steams,
these firms invested heavily in MBSs on the asset side, and they also depended
on mortgage origination and underwriting MBSs to generate operating income.
When Bear Steams failed, the writing was on the wall for these firms. Thus,
even without interconnections to similarly situated firms, Bear Stearns's failure
could disseminate throughout the financial sector.
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Various confidence-sustaining mechanisms have arisen to combat the
problem of bank runs, including interbank lending and liquidity support
arrangements (lending funds to a solvent bank using its assets as collateral),"
deposit insurance (protecting depositors of insolvent banks),12 and central bank
lender-of-last-resort liquidity support (lending when private parties will not).13
Indeed, regulatory oversight of the banking sector in the name of "safety and
soundness" has confidence-sustaining objectives. These mechanisms, however,
built on the experiences of preceding crises, may not be sufficient to avoid
fragility because unforeseen circumstances may arise in even a relatively static
banking system. More seriously, the banking system is not static because
parties will attempt to avoid the costs of confidence-sustaining mechanisms
while free-riding on the banking system stability that these mechanisms
11. Before the creation of the Federal Reserve System, the clearinghouse organized by money-
center banks to clear interbank transactions in ordinary times would issue "clearing house certificates"
temporary emergency loans to supply liquidity to a bank facing a run, which in effect provided support
through the credit of the banking collective. See ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF
1907, at 107-08, 168-69 (2007); Gary Gorton, Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the
U.S., 45 J. EcON. HIST. 277 (1985); Gary Gorton & Donald Mullineaux, The Joint Production of
Confidence: Endogenous Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-Bank Clearinghouses, 19 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 457 (1987). In their account, Friedman and Schwartz attribute the
atrophying of this clearinghouse support capability to the formation of the Federal Reserve System.
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960
(1963).
12. For example, as provided in the United States by the FDIC.
13. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET (14th
ed., John Murray 1931) (1873) (explaining the role of the central banker as lender of last resort). In
practice, the central bank's capacity to play this role is limited by the sense of panic its intervention may
create. Some Fed insiders believe that at least the timing of Bear Steams's failure was tied to the Fed's
announcement of a special program to support the liquidity of primary dealers in Treasury securities,
which the market apparently misinterpreted as the Fed's anticipation of a Bear Stearns failure. Markus
K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 23 J. EcON. PERSP. 77, 88
(2009). The Fed has been reluctant to invoke its emergency powers in the past for fear of panicking
market participants. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England's announcement that it was providing
liquidity support to Northern Rock seems to have triggered the retail deposit run that played so vividly
on television. See Hyun Song Shin, Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run that Heralded the
Global Financial Crisis, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 101, 102 (2009). Indeed, U.S. banks have historically been
reluctant to access the Fed's discount window-a much milder signal of financial distress-to avoid
sending a signal of financial weakness. Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal
Reserve in the Early Stages ofthe Financial Crisis, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 55-56 (2009); Craig Furfine,
The Reluctance To Borrow from the Fed, 72 ECON. LETTERS 209 (2001).
First-world economies have generally rejected the standard theoretical solution to single or
system-wide bank runs: the immediate suspension of convertibility by freezing deposits in place. Under
such a regime, depositors would know that no one could withdraw ahead of them and thus would lose
the incentive to run in the first instance. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 5. The maintenance of such
a regime is not credible, even if ex ante efficient, because governments are likely to permit "hardship" or
"high need" claims for withdrawal. A mechanism that distinguishes among withdrawal claims would be
ex post efficient, but this reintroduces depositor incentives to avoid the risk of losing the worthiness
competition and finding that earlier withdrawals at par have produced lower recovery rates on later
withdrawals. For formalization of this "time-inconsistency problem in banking policy," see Huberto M.
Ennis & Todd Keister, Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils ofIntervention, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1588,
1589 (2009).
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provide. Some costs are direct, such as the deposit insurance fee. Other costs
are indirect, such as the imposition of capital requirements, regulatory
accounting, and conduct constraints. In the effort to avoid these costs, various
banks and nonbanks will test the possibilities of regulatory arbitrage by moving
some traditional banking activity outside the banking system (as it is defined
for regulatory purposes), thereby expanding the boundaries of the banking
system. As "shadow banking" grows, the confidence-sustaining measures
designed for a narrower banking system will lose their capacity to stabilize the
system as a whole. This development reintroduces the fragility that such
measures were designed to mitigate. Moreover, discrete acts of boundary
expansion can collectively induce fragility because of their unforeseen
interactions. The banking system may unknowingly cross over from relatively
stable to fragile as it expands.14
Once again, the recent financial crisis offers good examples of boundary
expansion both by banks and nonbanks, as well as the consequences for
banking system fragility.
a. Boundary Expansion by Banks: Off-Balance-Sheet Banking
In the early-to-mid-2000s, banks established various conduits to finance
the growth of mortgage-based assets.15 These vehicles were designed to avoid
capital charges while free-riding on banking system stability. Although off-
balance sheet for regulatory capital purposes, conduits benefited from explicit
arrangements, like liquidity puts to the bank and letters of credit, and implicit
reputational concerns that would give credit suppliers full recourse to the bank
itself.16 Like the bank, these vehicles were used for maturity transformation:
here, the financing of long-term mortgage-related assets with short-term
liabilities.' 7 The liabilities were not retail deposits locked firmly in place by
14. For a very useful account of the structure and growth of the "shadow banking" system, see
Zoltan Paszar et al., Shadow Banking, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS 458
(20 10), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1640545. For an argument that the shadow banking system
should be brought within the support and regulatory umbrella of the regular banking system, see Morgan
Ricks, Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation (Columbia Univ. Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies,
Working Paper No. 370, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1571290.
15. See GILLIAN TETT, FOOL'S GOLD (2009); Daniel M. Covitz, Nellie Liang & Gustavo A.
Suarez, The Evolution ofa Financial Crisis: Panic in the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market (Fed.
Reserve Bank Fin, and Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2009-36, 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1 364576.
16. The Basel I Accords, which reflect harmonized worldwide practices on capital
requirements for banks, have a favorable capital charge for contractual credit lines and no charge at all
for implicit, reputation-based credit lines. See Brunnermeier, supra note 13, at 80-81. For financial
accounting purposes, mortgage securitizations supported by a third-party guarantee (as is common) that
are held through "Special Purpose Entities" are not consolidated in the bank's financial statements. FIN.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD NO. 140 T 35, 46,
182 (2000).
17. The conduits also supported the banks' underwriting of mortgage-based securities by




deposit insurance but rather short-term wholesale credit market instruments,
typically asset-backed commercial paper bought by institutional investors
(including money market funds) and corporate treasury departments. These
assets are a much more volatile funding source than retail deposits because of
the greater exposure of the uninsured creditors to default risk, their greater
monitoring capacity, and the high likelihood of correlated creditor judgments.
The simple decision not to roll over these instruments would amount to a
withdrawal, and if sufficiently pervasive, could lead to a run.I
Banking system expansion entailed serious consequences for bank
fragility. First, as market indices began to reflect investor pessimism about the
safety of MBSs, banks had to perform on their explicit and implicit
commitments, which meant bringing these assets explicitly onto the balance
sheet to avoid runs, defaults, and immediate calamity. This move both exposed
banks to losses on these assets and made apparent the weakness of the banks'
capital bases, which in turn reduced the confidence of banks' depositors and
other credit suppliers. Second, the loss of the source of short-term credit for a
substantial portion of the banks' assets made entire banks more fragile. As a
result of the expanded boundaries of the banking system, long-term illiquid
assets had come to be funded by the jumpiest of short-term creditors.
b. Boundary Expansion by Nonbanks
Money market mutual funds ("MMFs"), which as of pre-crisis 2007 held
over $3 trillion in short-term credit assets (as compared with bank deposits of
$9 billion), are good examples of "nonbank" banks that have grown outside the
boundaries of the banking system.2 0 MMFs arose in the 1970s as an arbitrage of
"Regulation Q": the ceiling on interest rates that depository institutions, that is,
banks and thrifts, could offer to depositors.21 At a time of high short-term
18. Thus, the televised retail depositor run in September 2007 on Northern Rock, the U.K.
building society, was preceded and precipitated by a much less visible run by wholesale credit suppliers
who were adjusting their own risk profiles and liquidity positions. Yet, Northern Rock had not made
itself a particularly risky financial institution; it avoided both off-balance-sheet financing and subprime
lending. See Song Shin, supra note 13.
19. Thus, the fragility of the conduits stuffed with mortgage-backed securities undermined the
stability of other conduits that held other asset-based securities, such as credit cards and other
receivables. The asset-backed securitization market, which relies on these conduit mechanisms, shrank
from a 2007 peak of nearly $1.2 trillion to $460 million in October 2009. See Covitz et al., supra note
15, at 39 tbl.2; Federal Reserve Release: Commercial Paper Rates and Outstanding, FED. RESERVE BD.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Download.aspx?rel=CP&series=40f558ddc745a653699db
cdf7d6baef9&filetype=spreadsheetml&label=include&layout-seriescolumn&from=01/01/2007&to-10/
31/2009 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
20. Flow ofFunds Accounts ofthe United States Release Z. 1, FED. RESERVE BD., at 60 tbl.L.5
I. 7-10, available at http://www.federalreserve.govIRELEASES/zi/20090611/zI.pdf.
21. Interest rate ceilings for depository institutions were defended as stability-enhancing
because they mitigated the interest rate risks in the maturity mismatch between short-term deposits and
long-term assets. The rise of MMFs was particularly devastating to thrifts, whose assets were
concentrated in fixed-rate, long-term mortgage loans. The flow of retail deposits out of thrifts and into
MMFs led to the insolvency of many thrifts, various futile and counterproductive efforts to save the
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interest rates, MMFs provided retail savers access to money market rates and
became a substitute for both savings and checking accounts. Accounts at
MMFs, however, are not federally insured. The industry is premised on
providing the functional equivalent of insurance: a credible commitment that
MMFs will maintain a $1 per share net asset value and that funds will be
immediately accessible. This commitment is supported by SEC regulatory
requirements of high credit quality and short-term maturity (fewer than 180
days on average) of MMF holdings.22 The focus on not "breaking the buck,"
buttressed by historical success in this regard, is the industry's protection
against runs.23
The limitations of these SEC-crafted substitutes for deposit insurance
became apparent in the recent financial crisis, which vividly demonstrated the
fragility of MMFs and the ramifications of that fragility for the banking system
as a whole. At the time of the Lehman failure, the Reserve Fund (a major
MMF) held $785 million in Lehman commercial paper, an economically
significant amount, but even if the eventual recovery in bankruptcy was $0, it
was still only 1.2% of the Reserve Fund's $62 billion in assets. Yet, knowing
that the composition of the Reserve Fund's portfolio meant it was likely to
"break the buck," its depositors immediately began a run--eventually
amounting to redemption requests of $40 billion-that was halted only by a
freeze in redemptions. 24 The run at the Reserve Fund threatened to disseminate
through the $3 trillion MMF sector via the mechanism of similarity or
commonality, not contagion. Many MMFs had substantial holdings of
commercial paper issued by financial firms, meaning that, like the Reserve
Fund, many MMFs would be threatened by further financial firm insolvencies.
The Treasury immediately stepped into the breach with an explicit guarantee of
all money market funds on deposit prior to the Lehman bankruptcy filing.25
industry, and finally an enormous federal bailout program, $400 billion by some estimates, the largest
such program until the recent financial crisis.
22. The SEC also provides a form of regulatory forbearance that permits MMFs to use "hold
to maturity" rather than "mark to market" valuations to smooth over small deviations from par, 15
U.S.C. § 80a (2006), and grants regulatory relief to permit MMF sponsors to support $1 net asset values
through buying distressed securities in MMF portfolios. The successful (and very modest) SEC reform
proposal provides a useful summary of the current rules. See Rules and Regulations, Investment
Company Act of 1940, 75 Fed. Reg. 42, 10,109 (March 4, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270 (2010));
Forms Prescribed Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 75 Fed. Reg. 42, 10,118 (March 4, 2010)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 274 (2010)).
23. For an account of the longstanding practice of MMF sponsors backstopping MMF
portfolios to protect $1 net asset values, see MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, SPONSOR SUPPORT KEY TO
MONEY MARKET FUNDS (2010). During the 2007-2009 period, sponsors intervened on behalf of at least
thirty-six large MMFs. Id. at 4. Most sponsors run extensive families of mutual funds, and protecting the
"family" MMF preserves valuable reputation. The Reserve Fund was part of a narrowly focused fund
family.
24. See Aaron Elstein, Inside the Panic at Reserve Fund, CRAIN'S N.Y. BuS., May 11, 2009.
25. The Treasury offered a jury-rigged use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund-$50 billion
laid against $3 trillion in MMF assets. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUND,
FINANCIAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 14 (2008). On the other hand, a Reserve Fund-type loss




Concern for the fragility of MMFs apparently shaped other key regulatory
actions in the financial crisis. For example, some industry participants believe
that FDIC actions, which fully protected creditors of Wachovia, but not
Washington Mutual, were based on a well-founded belief that a Wachovia
default would have "broken the buck" of one of the largest MMFs.26 In other
words, in order to address the fragility of MMFs as nonbank banks, the FDIC
was forced into interventions that created instability because of their seemingly
arbitrary treatment of bank creditors.
The fragility of MMFs affected the banking system generally, and indeed,
the entire financial sector. Notwithstanding the Treasury's guarantee (or
perhaps because of its insufficiency), MMF depositors withdrew funds from so-
called "prime" MMFs and reinvested in "Treasury" MMFs or directly in U.S.
27Treasury instruments. MMFs themselves reallocated funds from the private
28short-term credit market to Treasury issuances. The shift added stress to the
banking system in two ways. First, many banks and other financial
intermediaries had come to finance both on- and off-balance-sheet assets
29through the short-term credit markets, where MMFs played a significant role.
Those markets virtually disappeared.30  Second, banks regularly provided
backup credit lines to protect industrial firms from the rollover risk associated
with commercial paper. Ordinarily, this risk related to a firm's particular
26. The plausibility of this concern is supported by detailed disclosure by the Federal Reserve,
which showed that nine of the ten largest MMFs, representing two-thirds of all MMF assets, turned to
the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money-Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility. Only Vanguard did
not use the emergency credit facility. See Ben Levisohn & Daisy Maxey, Absent Help, More Funds
Might Have Broken Buck, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Dec. 1, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704594804575648872562084814.html.
27. See INV. Co. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 147-51 tbls.38, 41 & 42
(49th ed. 2009) (showing, for 2008, (1) outflows of cash from nongovernment MMFs and inflows into
government MMFs; (2) asset composition shift by nongovemment MMFs away from private firm
issuances into government issuances; (3) asset composition shift by government MMFs away from
repurchase agreements secured by government securities to direct government issuances, especially
Treasury bills). Id.
28. Id. at 150-51 tbls.41 & 42.
29. See Gordon, supra note 6; see also Philip Swagel, The Financial Crisis: An Inside View, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 31 (David Romer & Justin Wolfers eds., 2009), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea/-/media/Files/ProgramsfES/BPEA/2009_spring.bpea_paper
s/2009_springbpea swagel.pdf (explaining that as wholesale credit markets froze, "broker-dealers
began cutting their credit lines to clients such as hedge funds and other counterparties . . . [which]
threatened to lead to fire sales of assets and a disorderly deleveraging").
30. To be sure, MMF behavior was only part of the reason for the seizing-up of short-term
credit markets in 2008, as MMFs accounted for only 20-25% of these markets. See Gordon, supra note
6. Nevertheless, rules designed by the SEC to stabilize the net asset values of MMFs, in particular the
shortening of portfolio maturities, artificially increased the supply of short-term credit. In turn, this
increased the use of securities markets to transform short-term liabilities into long-term assets. This
meant that bank finance and corporate finance were subject to the dysfunction of short-term credit
markets at times of financial stress. The propensity of short-term credit markets to seize up is modeled in
Viral V. Acharya, Douglas M. Gale & Tanju Yorulmazer, Rollover Risk and Market Freezes (July 1,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1325887 (noting that for assets
with small default risks funded by rollovers, shift in sentiment from optimistic to pessimistic can lead to
sudden market freezes).
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business circumstances, but as short-term credit markets shut down, many firms
called on their backup lines.31 This meant that banks were forced to extend
credit unselectively at a time when they needed to build reserves.
Restoring a semblance of bank stability required the Fed's emergency
creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility to buy commercial paper. 32
As the Fed's press release explained: "A large share of outstanding commercial
paper is issued or sponsored by financial intermediaries, and their difficulties
placing commercial paper have made it more difficult for those intermediaries
to play their vital role in meeting the credit needs of businesses and
households." 33
4. Summary of Fragility
The argument is not that banks and the banking system are "fragile" in the
sense that there is a high probability of bank failure or that the combination of
banks and nonbanks is highly probable to fail. Rather, "fragility" means that
relatively small shocks can have disruptive effects arising from the time-
varying liquidity demands of capital suppliers and the illiquidity needs of
capital users. This fragility may grow along with the complexity of financial
intermediation and quickly outstrip the already imperfect confidence-sustaining
measures previously put in place. One can believe not only that "panics are
[not] an inherent feature of banking generally" and that the "details of the
institutional setting" matter crucially,34 but also that with complexity and
inevitable changes in circumstances and institutions, the tensions
comprehended within the banking system will recurrently break out into
financial sector crisis.
B. Pro-Cyclical Bias of Capitalist Financial System
A second source of systemic instability in the financial sector may be the
structure of the capitalist financial system, which has a strongly pro-cyclical
bias tending toward asset bubbles and increased leverage. This thesis has two
versions: first, the "strong form" associated with the economist Hyman Minsky
and part of a broader Keynesian theory of the business cycle and the
government's role; and second, the "semi-strong" offshoot that focuses on the
31. See Victoria Ivashina & David Scharfstein, Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of
2008, at 2-3, 13-16 (July 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1297337.
32. For a regulatory history of the facility, see the New York Federal Reserve Bank's
compilation, http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/cpff.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
33. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 7, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081007c.htm.
34. Gary Gorton, The Panic of2007, at 2 (Int'l Ctr. for Fin, at Yale Sch. of Mgmt. Research





interaction of asset bubbles and credit expansion, particularly innovations in
credit supply.
1. Minsky's "Financial Instability Hypothesis"
Minsky's particular take on Keynes adds a "financial theory of
investment" in which the uncertainty of payoffs plays a significant role in
business investments that require external funds.35 Lenders and borrowers each
require a "margin of safety" for their decisions. At the bottom of the business
cycle (or sectoral cycle), firms are pessimistic, and external finance is
demanded (supplied) only to the extent that debt and principal payments can be
covered by current cash flows-that is, making no profit assumptions about the
new productive capacities that are externally funded. Minsky calls this stage
"hedge finance." If profit targets are reached, borrowers (lenders) become
bolder and obtain (provide) external finance to fund new projects on a narrower
margin of safety that requires only that interest payments be covered from
current cash flows; debt repayment, by contrast, will require new profits. This
is "speculative finance." In the final stage, some firms move into "Ponzi
finance," meaning that coverage of both debt and principal payments requires
profitability from new projects (profits which may include assumptions about
declining refinancing costs or the ability to sell appreciated assets).
Critically, individual decisions feed into the overall business cycle: as
total investments increase, the multiplier effect on demand produces higher
profits. This effect increases the likelihood that firms will meet or exceed profit
targets on new projects, consistent with the desired margin of safety, and thus,
encourages greater demand (supply) for external finance. Soon, of course, these
expectations are built in. Thus, not only do future profits depend on current
aggregate investing, but also the individual borrower's (lender's) assessment of
whether an investment has met its target in light of the desired margin of safety.
If some borrowers (lenders) become pessimistic about realizing profit targets
from further investment, and they will cut back. This action reduces aggregate
demand and, via the multiplier effect, lowers profits, which in turns constrains
investing in the next period as firms begin to miss their profit targets. As the
economy (or the sector) contracts, financial distress spreads first to Ponzi-
financed firms and then to speculatively financed firms and their credit
suppliers. A prolonged expansion that depends heavily on external finance will
35. What follows is based on HYMAN P. MINSKY, SECURITIZATION (L. Randall Wray ed.,
2008); HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 171-253 (1986); Hyman P. Minsky,
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 74, 1992),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=161024; and L. Randall Wray & Eric
Tymoigne, Macroeconomics Meets Hyman P. Minsky: The Financial Theory of Investment (Levy Econ.
Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 543, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1262296. See also KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra
note 4, at 16-37.
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produce an unraveling with significant, even severe, impacts on the financial
system.3 6
2. Asset Bubbles and Credit Expansion
A modified or semi-strong version of the financial instability thesis
focuses particularly on the appeal and dangers of credit-financed asset bubbles,
particularly where new forms of credit help fuel the bubble. This account helps
distinguish between the dot-com bubble, which left the financial system
unscathed when it collapsed, and the housing bubble, which had very different
consequences.
a. Bubbles
If markets were "complete," meaning parties could acquire security
positions that would provide certain payoffs in all possible contingencies, and if
all information were common knowledge, then bubbles, at least "rational
bubbles," would be highly unlikely.37 These are strong assumptions that
obviously do not hold. Many mechanisms have been proposed by which buyers
might overpay for securities, including incorrect beliefs about fundamental
values based on inadequate information, mistaken beliefs about what other
parties believe about fundamental values,38 agency costs in investment
management, 3 9 and heuristic biases that interfere with rational decision-
making.4 0 In theory, arbitrage activity by informed traders should bring share
36. Some have suggested that the Minsky thesis requires irrational behavior on the part of
firms and lenders. See, e.g., Ben S. Bemanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the
Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 258 (1983). But irrationality is not
required once we assume that parties generally have insufficient information to distinguish between
profits on new investments that were correctly forecasted based on the prior state of the world and
profits from unforecasted increases in the investment of others that raised overall demand. A different
critique of the Minsky thesis is that its deterministic character does not account for the differences across
countries and over time in the appearance of pathological asset bubbles. Minsky may describe a
tendency or vulnerability, but other institutional (and noninstitutional) elements are critical prerequisites
of severe financial distress.
37. This discussion draws from MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (2009); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS (2000);
Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Bubbles and Crises, 110 ECON. J. 236 (2000); and Markus K.
Brunnermeier, Bubbles, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 578 (2d ed. 2008).
38. For example, all investors may share the same beliefs about the fundamental value of a
security but not knowledge of that shared belief. Many parties may believe that other parties will
mistakenly value the security, and so bid up the security price in expectation of a future sale to
misinformed investors.
39. For example, investment managers may want to demonstrate their investment prowess to
clients by investing; investment managers may engage in herd behavior because of relative performance
evaluation against peers and the market itself; and investment managers have limited liability and can
otherwise shift risk to clients in the pursuit of upside potential.
40. For example, over-optimism bias, in which parties on a lucky trend overestimate their
ability to outperform the market, or "loss aversion," in which parties are unwilling to sell-out loss
positions despite information that would suggest such a course.
168
Confronting Financial Crisis
prices back in line and prevent a bubble from getting much headway. But
arbitrage may be under supplied because of institutional or legal constraints on
short saleS41 or because arbitrage is costly. Arbitrageurs face "fundamental
risk," the possibility that a change in fundamentals will reverse the previous
overpricing, saddling them with losses; arbitrageurs also face "noise trader
risk."42 Uninformed traders may continue to buy, or worse, buy in greater
volume, which increases mispricing. There is no set time for prices to converge
on fundamental value. Meanwhile, the arbitrageur's potential losses increase. In
both instances, absorbing these losses is particularly costly for an undiversified
investor or for the hedge fund manager who faces potential withdrawals from
investors who can directly observe only ex post results, not managerial skill.
Indeed, if arbitrage is insufficient to constrain a bubble, arbitrageurs-who are
trading to make money, not to provide the public good of more accurate asset
prices-may flip to become "momentum traders" who contribute to the
bubble.4 3
b. Bubbles and Credit Expansion
Asset bubbles may come and go without leaving the financial sector and
the economy in ruins. What may produce a financial sector crisis is the
interaction between a bubble and credit expansion that occurs either through
deregulation or through financial innovation. Assuming that the short-term
supply of a particular asset is fixed, a credit expansion increases demand for the
asset (because of lower interest costs from the increase in the effective money
supply), and thus, its price. If the lender relies on the asset as collateral, price
appreciation will increase the amount that can be lent (assuming a fixed capital
requirement). This further expansion of credit may in turn raise asset prices and
promote activity to increase the asset's supply. If the "boom" continues for a
while, the bank may adjust downward its risk assessment of lending to acquire
the asset. This action also lowers interest rates, and thus, supports even higher
asset prices. Eventually, parties discover that assets are overvalued relative to
the nonfinancial sector cash flows on which their value depends. For example,
commercial landlords discover that businesses cannot pay escalating rents.
Asset values decline; parties default on loans; collateral is insufficient to cover
the losses; and collateral sales further depress asset prices-a spiral that may
result in the impairment of bank capital. The damaged banks begin to ration
credit, limiting it to their most credit-worthy borrowers. As the debt-fueled
41. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty
Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 726-29 (2003).
42. Id. at 725 (regarding fundamental risk); id. at 726 (regarding noise trader risk). It might be
possible to hedge against fundamental industry risk-for example, going long on Intel while shorting
AMD-but that will not protect the arbitrageur against an unexpected turnaround if AMD releases a
superior processor at a lower price.
43. Id. at 730.
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bubble collapses, the industry devoted to meeting the demand for assets also
collapses, a further macroeconomic shock. The process by which stronger bank
balance sheets helped promote the bubble now reverses itself; the feedback
loop becomes negative.
In theory, regulation should be programmed to force counter-cyclical
behavior. In particular, it should constrain bank lending in good times-
through a compulsory increase in reserves, for example. The impulse will be
strong to evade a regime compelling banks to stockpile funds when the
opportunity cost seems highest, even if the regime is designed to reduce the risk
of some great systemic harm.
A different regulatory move is to limit credit creation and extension and to
resist the siren call of deregulation. The 1920s stock market bubble was fueled
by the innovation of margin lending for stock purchases. High margin
requirements now enforced by the Fed limit that form of credit creation. The
2000s housing bubble was fueled in part by asset securitization, which, by
converting low-quality home mortgages into ostensibly high-quality (AAA-
rated) securities, expanded the credit available for home finance. Tight
regulation of banks and the financial system more generally may hold down the
incidence of financial crises, as illustrated by the almost complete absence of
banking crises in the 1945-1971 period compared to prior and subsequent
periods." In 1971, the United States abandoned the gold standard, a change
that heralded a period of financial liberalization that is associated with many
more crises.
Notwithstanding government efforts to constrain and even control the
growth of credit, private efforts to expand credit drive many financial
innovations. Charles Kindleberger and Ronald Aliber document many
historical instances of this phenomenon, including a telling case of how
nineteenth-century British merchants evaded the government's credit creation
constraints through the use of successively endorsed bills of exchange as a
currency substitute. Successive holders relied on the credit of the endorsers as
well as the bill's issuer, sometimes passing the notes at a discount to face
value.45 The chain of signatories opened up the endorsers to counterparty risk
from merchants who levered up using bills that were only sporadically
redeemed-until holders lost confidence and began to redeem suddenly.
Moving one-hundred years forward, part of what powered the recent subprime
mortgage boom was the banks' desire to avoid capital requirements that limited
their leverage.46 As described previously but now understood as an effort to
evade leverage constraints, banks established off-balance-sheet conduits or
44. FRANCIS ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, supra note 5, at 2, 11. Among the regulatory
constraints were entry barriers and price controls that protected banks from competition. See JEAN-
CHARLES ROCHET, supra note 5, at 30.
45. KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 4, at 64-83.




special investment vehicles ("SIVs") that held large quantities of the "super
senior" tranches of mortgage-backed collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs").
The banks financed these long-term debt holdings through short-term
wholesale credit markets and profited from the difference between long-term
and short-term rates, a so-called "carry trade." As noted above, these structures
did not require additional capital, and thus, were a tempting way to increase the
supply of credit for real estate finance.
Credit's role in fueling asset bubbles and the persistent effort by banks
and other financial intermediaries to create more credit (evading the regulatory
regime if necessary) help to explain why financial sector crises are recurrent.
Otherwise put, credit will predictably expand in unpredictable ways, tending to
produce asset bubbles, the collapse of which can produce severe financial
sector distress.
C. The Uncertain Effects of Financial Innovation
A third source of systemic instability in the financial sector is the role of
financial innovation, which can have unpredictable but powerful effects on
financial firms.
1. The Systemic Conundrum
Financial innovation presents a conundrum. Its inception may be entirely
benign, a genuine advance that lowers the cost of capital by, for example,
reducing information requirements, lowering the costs of diversification, or
enabling superior risk sharing, which are all straightforward efficiencies. 7 But
then, as the innovation disseminates, its properties and its consequences
change. Think of an S-curve of innovation effects. At a critical point of
dissemination (which may not map onto the S-curve of dissemination itself),
the innovation's principal effects switch from the local to the systemic. Effects
may become systemic when dissemination of the innovation transforms
practices on which the innovation relied,48 significantly changes the patterns of
risk distribution,4 9 substantially substitutes for alternative methods of achieving
47. Some might dispute a pro-efficiency account of financial innovation. Paul Volcker, for
example, is famously noted as saying that the last genuine financial innovation in the past few decades
has been the ATM. Alan Murray, Paul Volcker: Think More Boldly, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, at R7.
Nonefficiency drivers of financial innovation may include: regulatory arbitrage around capital or activity
limits; repackaging of standard devices into custom forms to mask higher prices; creation of financial
products that create exploitable information asymmetries; and signaling firm quality where financial
ideas have little intellectual property protection. We take an agnostic view on whether financial
innovation is generally efficient, all things considered. It seems to be a recurrent feature in capital
markets.
48. For example, the way in which the increasingly lax underwriting standards in mortgage
origination undermined the reliability of the loans that entered into mortgage backed securities.
49. For example, the way in which credit default swaps ended up concentrating risk in AIG.
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a similar result,50 or attracts new investment flows that affect asset prices and
underlying risk assumptions." When an innovation's effects are principally
local, they are relatively easy to assess, and if on balance the innovation does
not pan out, the consequences are not harmful. If the consequences of
innovation, however, are locally good but systemically bad, the net
consequences can be quite costly.52 The systemic effects of an innovation are
often hard to appreciate ex ante and even harder to calculate. Systemic risk may
be described by a curve that starts off concave and then, at some inflection
point in the innovation's adoption, becomes sharply convex. 53
Indeed, in the early stages, the systemic risk curve may be downward-
sloping; innovation may reduce systemic risk-that was an argument for
securitization. It is only at the inflection point that systemic risk shifts direction,
but it may do so sharply. Innovation's risk is that, even if the functional form
can be predicted, the inflection point cannot be. Unless regulators severely
clamp down on innovation (which is difficult in many respects), particular
financial innovations will disseminate rapidly with unexpected systemic
consequences that may eventually produce a financial sector crisis.54
One response might be for regulators to clamp down on innovations that
are obviously an evasion of a regulatory restraint, such as pure regulatory
arbitrage. The problem is that the initial innovation may not have that purpose
or immediate effect, but in application (or sub-innovation), it may take on that
character in ways that are hard to monitor.
Securitization is a good example. A bank may have a comparative
advantage in identifying good borrowers but not in risk bearing. Because of
regulatory or prudential limits, some parties can bear only AAA risks while
others can be more aggressive. Securitization, which separates credit allocation
and risk-bearing, worked successfully for many years in the finance of car
50. For example, the way in which the commercial paper market, fueled in part by money
market funds, became a substitute for long-term finance.
51. For example, the way in which mortgage-backed securitization contributed to the
escalation of real estate prices and the increase in systemic risk associated with such assets. Mortgage-
backed securities provided a low cost way to diversify against the idiosyncratic risk of real estate assets,
and when tranched, augmented the supply of purportedly AAA assets. The demand for such assets-for
example by banks seeking to satisfy regulatory capital requirements at lowest cost or by other investors
seeking highly safe assets yielding more than sovereign debt-drew a flood of funds into real estate
markets that increased the price of real estate assets and thus changed the systemic risk associated with
real estate investment.
52. The systemic effects can arise from an overly optimistic assessment of the innovation
driven by initial positive returns under benign economic conditions before competition has competed
away rents. This can lead to a quick infusion of resources into the innovation that changes background
assumptions. See Emine Boz & Enrique Mendoza, Financial Innovation, the Discovery ofRisk, and the
U.S. Credit Crisis (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 101164, 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1641015.
53. In this regard, systemic risk is just the dark side of "network externalities" that are often
much praised.
54. One way to understand the regulators' job in a dynamic environment is to identify the




loans, credit card receivables, and conventional mortgages long before
subprime mortgages were thrown into the mix. Indeed, insofar as securitization
took long-lived assets like home mortgages off banks' balance sheets, it was
heralded as reducing fragility. Even after the securitization of subprimes,
further innovation was required to fuel the crisis: the creation of CDOs built on
packages of subprime MBSs55 and the banks' creation of conduits and SIVs to
hold such securities in evasion of capital requirements. Where exactly on this
curve should the regulators have intervened?
The ultimate irony, of course, is that even innovations that appear to
56reduce systemic risk may be laying the groundwork for an eventual crisis.
Take a risk-spreading innovation that enhances stability in the short or medium
run. Financial innovations run on models that critically depend on historical
data for their calibration. A period of stability reduces measures of volatility,
and that low-volatility experience gets factored into pricing models and
estimates of liquidity. As the yield-differentials between risky and risk-free
assets narrow, risk-taking becomes more aggressive, producing a keg of
gunpowder waiting for a spark.
The challenge of financial innovation is that its systemic effects may
simply be unforeseeable until they materialize to create or contribute to a
financial sector crisiS. 57 For example, indices based on super-senior tranches of
MBSs reflected only very small default risk levels throughout the first half of
July 2007, despite the fact that such securities were already a ticking time bomb
55. Another example of this phenomenon is CDOs created with tranches of other CDOs, so-
called "CDO-squareds" and "synthetic CDOs," which often were the long side of hedging positions or
negative directional bets. See GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, THE GREATEST TRADE EVER 176 (2009).
56. See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESILIENCE IN THE FACE OF CYCLICAL CHALLENGES 51 (2006) ("There is growing
recognition that the dispersion of credit risk by banks to a broader and more diverse group of investors,
rather than warehousing such risk on their balance sheets, has helped to make the banking and overall
financial system more resilient.... These new participants ... help to mitigate and absorb shocks to the
financial system.. .. The improved resilience may be seen in fewer bank failures and more consistent
credit provision."); COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GP. II, TOWARD GREATER FINANCIAL
STABILITY: A PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVE 1 (2005), available at
http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/crmpg2/docs/CRMPG-lI.pdf ("[T]he Policy Group shared a broad
consensus that the already low statistical probabilities of the occurrence of truly systemic financial
shocks had further declined over time. The belief that the risk of systemic financial shocks had fallen
was based on a number of considerations including: (I) the strength of the key financial institutions at
the core of the financial system; (2) improved risk management techniques; (3) improved official
supervision; (4) more effective disclosure and greater transparency; (5) strengthened financial
infrastructure; and (6) more effective techniques to hedge and widely distribute financial risks. Indeed,
members took some collective comfort from the fact that in the post LTCM/Russia period, financial
markets had absorbed with remarkable resiliency the effects of multiple disturbances, including but not
limited to: (1) the bursting of the technology bubble of the late 1990s; (2) a mild recession; (3)
September 11; (4) two wars; (5) an oil shock; and (6) a wave of corporate scandals (including a handful
of major bankruptcies).").
57. For a perspective from complexity theory, see DIDIER SORNETTE, WHY STOCK MARKETS
CRASH: CRITICAL EVENTS IN COMPLEX FINANCIAL SYSTEMS (2002). Somette nevertheless believes that
the timing of crashes is somewhat predictable from statistical anomalies in the time series of relevant
data, even if the particular features that lead to the crash are not. Didier Sornette, Dragon-Kings, Black
Swans and the Prediction of Crises, 2 INT'L J. TERRASPACE SCI. & ENGINEERING 1 (2009).
173
Yale Journal on Regulation
on financial firms' balance sheets.58 Although the recent financial crisis offers
many examples, two effects of one important innovation-credit default
swaps-illustrate the unpredictable but sometimes devastating consequences of
financial innovation.
2. The Effects of Credit Default Swaps on Investment Bank Fragility
One example of the disruptive effects of credit default swaps ("CDSs") is
the way they made obsolete the free-standing investment bank on the Bear
Steams/Lehman/Goldman Sachs model by significantly increasing its financial
fragility. How so? Investment banks start with the fragility of banks (and then
some) because investment banks fund many of their activities through short-
term debt obligations that are on a much quicker trigger than retail deposits or
even commercial paper. A significant portion of an investment bank's funding
needs are covered by very short-term loans, sometimes overnight loans, which
are typically collateralized through a pledge of high-quality securities whose
notional value is greater than the loan. An investment bank also covers its
funding needs through the "rehypothecation" of customer assets, that is, the
pledging of securities and cash in a customer's margin accounts as collateral for
the bank's own loans. If the investment bank begins to look undercapitalized,
lenders can break off their funding arrangements overnight. Even if a loan is
fully collateralized, who wants to be involved in a potentially messy insolvency
and liquidation when there are more credit-worthy borrowers? Customers can
immediately close accounts to avoid similar entanglements. Because the
investment bank does not have recourse to a lender of last resort, a run can be
devastating. Of course, this model of investment banking has a long history.
The reliance on short-term funding has been explained as a commitment device
to maintain sufficient capital to assure "confidence,"and as a ruthless survival
mechanism that eliminates nonexpert bankers.59
Credit default swaps add a fatal fragility because they provide information
that was not previously available: first, about comparative investment bank
default risk; and second, about collateral default risk. Large investment banks
will have significant issues of debt securities outstanding. With the advent of
CDSs, market participants can now buy (or sell) credit protection on the bank's
debt to protect themselves against default risk on portfolio securities, to protect
themselves against the loss of other valuable relationships with the bank, or to
speculate on default risk. The cost of this protection is readily observable even
though CDSs are (currently) traded over the counter ("OTC") rather than on
exchanges. Thus, as financial conditions become choppy, CDS spreads reflect
58. See, e.g., Brunnermeier, supra note 13, at 83 fig.1; Gorton, supra note 34, at 7-23.
59. Charles Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring
Optimal Banking Arrangements, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 497 (1991); Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G.





the market consensus about the default risks of any particular investment bank,
and just as importantly, the comparative risk of each. Instead of hunches, body
language, local gossip, and rumors, a lender or customer can look to a
quantitative measure of absolute and comparative risk, a far superior
monitoring mechanism. The market measure may even be inaccurate, but it
provides a node around which sophisticated opinion can crystallize. It provides
common knowledge that can coordinate the behavior of disparate individuals, a
classic condition for a run.
Similarly, CDS prices (including CDS indices) inform the valuation of
securities that the investment bank might offer to collateralize a loan. 60 As
spreads widen, suggesting greater default risk for a particular kind of collateral
(high-grade tranches of MBSs, most recently), lenders may insist on greater
"haircuts" for collateral purposes (for example, a bond may be valued at 90%
of face value, rather than 95%), or they may refuse to accept the collateral at
all.61 This practice reduces the supply of collateral and makes it harder for the
investment bank to meet its short-term funding needs. The runs on Bear Steams
and Lehman were driven both by absolute and comparative default factors, as
62well as increasing haircuts on collateral. The remaining investment banks
converted to bank holding companies, which are sheltered by access to the Fed
discount window and other liquidity facilities that the Fed can readily provide.
The point is that the inventors had no idea that CDSs would have such
important consequences for a long-standing form of economic organization.
Nothing about the risk distribution features of CDSs themselves was critical;
rather, it was the new information provided by market making in CDSs that
sounded the death knell for investment banks. Certainly, this was a surprise to
the banks, which were active CDS dealers whose market-making activity
contributed significantly to the dissemination of this innovation.
60. For example, a new index, the ABX index, was created in January 2006 to measure the
payment probability of MBSs by vintage (month of issuance) and tranche (credit rating/relative
seniority), as reflected in CDS costs for selected issues. For the first time, market participants had a clear
view of the expectations of other participants of the likely track of mortgage delinquencies and housing
prices, that is, the value of the mortgages that were folded into the securities, and thus, the value of the
securities themselves. See Gorton, supra note 34, at 7-23; Gary Gorton, Information, Liquidity, and the
(Ongoing) Panic of2007, 99(2) AM. ECON. REV. 567 (2009). In July 2007, the ABX index for the AAA
tranche of recently issued MBSs began to fall from par (I 00%)-quite notable for newly issued, highly
rated securities-and eventually fell below 40% at the end of 2008. See Brunnermeier, supra note 13, at
83 fig.1.
61. See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, The Role of Liquidity in Financial Crises, in
LIQUIDITY AND CRISES (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 33 tbl.1), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1268367 (showing that the haircut on AAA-rated,
asset-backed CDOs increased from 2-4% in January-May 2007 to 15% in April 2008).
62. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton, Bruce Kogut & Tano Santos, Presentation at the Preventing the
Next Financial Crisis Conference at Columbia Business School 9 (Dec. 11, 2008) (slideshow on file
with authors) (showing higher CDS spreads for Lehman); Alistair Barr, Lehman CDS Spreads Wider
than Bear's Before Bailout: CDR, MARKETWATCH, Sept. 11, 2008,
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-cds-spreads-wider-than-bears-before-bailout-cdr.
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3. The Uncertain Incidence of CDS Losses
Credit default swaps had another unintended effect. In the face of
systemic financial distress, the uncertainty engendered by the CDS market
about the solvency of the various firms that traded them played a major role in
the seizing up of interbank lending markets that marked the most critical
moment of the crisis. 6 3 The fallout from the Lehman collapse in September
2008 illustrates the point. Lehman filed for bankruptcy with outstanding
liabilities of approximately $650 billion. There were approximately $450
billion (in notional amount) of CDSs written on Lehman's debt. "Notional
amount" is not by any stretch the same as "net amount," since CDS dealers
commonly hedge almost all of their counterparty exposure on a particular
position through a trade with the same or a different party. At its peak, the total
CDS market was approximately $57 trillion in notional amount, which
64
reportedly netted out to a gross market value of only $2 trillion. Nevertheless,
$450 billion is a substantial sum, and many critical things were unknown: the
valuation gap between Lehman's assets and its liabilities; the extent of
offsetting CDS trades; firm-specific exposures; firm-specific capacity to
perform on CDS obligations to counterparties; and the domino effect of CDS
65defaults by one or more firms on the solvency of other firms.
Indeed, a default on CDS obligations by AIG, which absorbed risk rather
than hedging it, was regarded as such a serious threat to the financial system
that the Fed provided $85 billion initially (and $120 billion eventually) to
rescue AIG after the Lehman collapse. When Lehman's CDSs were settled two
weeks later, per the terms in the standard-form CDS contract, the parties ran an
auction to determine the loss incurred, and the Lehman bonds were valued at 8
cents on the dollar-almost a total loss.66 Yet remarkably, the total that
subsequently changed hands in settlement of $414 billion in notional losses was
$6 billion, dispersed among several dealers-a sum that posed no threat to the
solvency of any bank, much less the world financial system. Adding the $20
billion in previously posted collateral (a known loss) to the $6 billion, this
63. For example, the "TED-spread," the interest rate differential between U.S. Treasury
securities and the LIBOR index of the rate banks charge on short-term interbank loans, shot up from
roughly 100 basis points in early September 2008 to 450 basis points following Lehman's bankruptcy
filing. Brunnermeier, supra note 13, at 86 fig.3. As Paul Krugman put it, "indicators of financial distress
have soared to the equivalent of a 107-degree fever, and large parts of the financial system have simply
shut down." Paul Krugman, Edge ofthe Abyss, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A25.
64. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: RESPONDING TO
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND MEASURING SYSTEMIC RISK 179 (2009).
65. See Mary Williams Walsh, Insurance on Lehman Debt Is the Industry's Next Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. I1, 2008, at B l. For a useful discussion of the debate about CDS riskiness, see Rene Stulz,
Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
wl 5384, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract- 1478802.
66. See Serena Ng, Emily Barrett & Jacob Bunge, Lehman Swap Payments Look Bigger than




meant that there had not been much risk-shifting on Lehman's debt, but there
had been a debilitating level of uncertainty.
The arguments for shifting CDS market-making to a clearinghouse (or
other central counterparty) rather than the present system of bilateral OTC
arrangements are: first, that it would provide particularized information on risk-
shifting; and second, that it would reduce counterparty risk by mutualizing any
failures on CDS obligations among clearinghouse members.6 7 Yet, at the time
credit default swaps were invented, they were a classic OTC product, a "start-
up" in the financial innovation field and hardly a risk to anyone. As to the
foreseeable importance of a clearinghouse: other OTC swap markets-equity
swaps and interest rate swaps-all functioned throughout the crisis. Moreover,
even expert risk evaluators like the Group of 30, which recommended
improvement in CDS clearing and settlement procedures in 2003 and produced
68a final monitoring report that called for further improvements in 2006, did not
focus on the systemic risks of the OTC structure.69
The unpredictable ways that financial innovation may critically contribute
to financial sector crises do not counsel regulatory despair. Mitigation of
foreseeable systemic risks and systemic risks that later materialize is, of course,
always the regulators' job. But the likelihood, if not inevitability, of
innovation's surprises will predictably produce financial sector distress.
D. The Political Economy ofRegulation
A fourth source of systemic risk is the regulators' frequent failure to
address new risks as they emerge during a period of financial sector expansion,
whether because of failures of cognition or, more likely, interest group
pressure. The systemic effect lies in the regulators' chronic inability to identify
and then rein in systemic risks that arise from private activity. In the run-up to
the recent financial crisis, for example, it is hard to believe that regulators were
unaware of declining standards in the underwriting of subprime mortgages, the
increased exposure of firms to subprime securitization, and the systemic risks
67. Of course, the concern is that if risk-taking by one or more members is imperfectly
monitored, mutualizing risk may become a vector of contagion.
68. GROUP OF 30, GLOBAL CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT: A PLAN OF ACTION (2003).
69. Nor did the Group of 30 focus on what, in hindsight, was a major flaw in the standard form
CDS agreement produced by the International Swap Dealers Association ("ISDA"): not requiring
collateral posting by AAA protection writers against adverse market moves on a CDS. This oversight
became an invitation to AIG Financial Products to write protection for the fee income without
considering risks of market volatility. When AIG lost its AAA rating in 2005, it stopped writing most
CDS protection, but the firm was by then massively exposed to mortgage market volatility. Robert
O'Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2008, at Al. More
generally, collateral posting on a CDS was tied in part to the credit rating of the counterparty rather than
only to the changing value of the instrument, reasonable perhaps in light of thin markets in many
specific CDSs, but a source of systemic risk.
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of the rapidly escalating CDS marketplace. 70 Yet, instances of regulatory
intervention were minor or nonexistent before the recent financial crisis. Much
to the relief of market participants, for example, the Fed's intervention in the
CDS market was limited to mechanical settlement issues.71
Regulatory inaction is tied up with the cycle of expansion itself.72 As the
strategies of financial firms generate increasing profits, the industry proponents
of potentially risky practices gain power vis-a-vis the regulators. First, the
growing profits seem to attest to the skill and sagacity of industry participants
and increase normative deference to their views. Second, the added profits
generate additional resources for lobbying, campaign contributions, and media
campaigns that enhance the industry's ability not only to block new legislation,
but also to enlist legislative and executive pressure against regulatory
intervention under existing authorities. Third, the enhanced profitability of the
financial sector typically produces economic spillovers that add to overall
economic growth, which is highly desired by political actors. Prosperity
becomes hostage to financial sector expansion, and industry objection to
regulatory action carries weight even with those who do not directly receive
industry largesse.7 3
An additional political economy factor that inhibits regulatory
intervention is the ability of industry participants to credibly threaten exit to a
more lax regulatory regime. This threat becomes more credible as profits
increase because more is at stake for the industry should "intrusive" regulation
diminish profitability. Ironically, if profits are positively linked to the riskiness
of the underlying activity, the credibility of the industry's exit threat grows
along with the case for intervention. Thus, for example, it is not a coincidence
70. See, e.g., Timothy F. Geithner, President and Chief Exec. Officer of the Fed. Reserve Bank
of N.Y., Risk Management Challenges in the U.S. Financial System, Remarks at the Global Association
of Risk Professionals ("GARP") 7th Annual Risk Management Convention & Exhibition 2 (Feb. 28,
2006) (transcript available at http://www.bis.org/review/r060303a.pdf) (observing bank exposure to
securitization in both balance sheet and revenue sense and noting increased but uncertain risks from
growth of CDS market from the "scale of losses in the event of default in the underlying credits or the
consequences of a prolonged disruption to market liquidity").
71. See LAWRENCE G. McDONALD & PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF
COMMON SENSE (2009); see also COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GP. II, supra note 56, at iv
(calling for "urgent" industry-wide efforts to resolve "serious 'back office' and trade assignment
problems). The report's lead-up to a modest reform agenda gives a chillingly prescient account of how a
systemic crisis would unfold, starting with a decline in asset prices "sufficiently steep to raise questions
about the creditworthiness of major counterparties or institutions," leading to "risk mitigation efforts
[that] add . .. pressures on asset prices" and "the evaporation of asset liquidity." Id. at 6-11.
72. For an account that focuses on the related problem of securities market bubbles, see Erik
F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay ofSecurities Regulation, 38 CONN.
L. REv. 393 (2006).
73. In discussing the regulators' difficulties in introducing counter-cyclicality, Professor
Goodhart observes: "[R]egulators/supervisors will be roundly condemned for tightening regulatory
conditions in asset prime booms by the combined forces of lenders, borrowers and politicians, the latter
tending to regard cyclical bubbles as beneficent trend improvements due to their own improved
policies." Charles A.E. Goodhart, Central Banks' Function To Maintain Financial Stability: An




that officially sanctioned reports worrying about New York City's decline as
financial center vis-a-vis London because of allegedly intrusive U.S. regulation
appeared at the height of the financial sector boom. 7 4
The political economy constraint operates on two different regulatory
levels. First, there is the constraint on efforts to regulate primary activity,
whether by administrative action under existing authority or new legislation.
But second, and perhaps more insidious, there is the constraint on the
regulators' capacity to collect information on new practices or important new
actors. Such information is necessary to assess potential increases in systemic
risk and to prepare contingency plans in light of the changing level and
incidence of risk. For example, in the recent crisis, no one-not private parties
nor regulators-knew the current risk distribution from the trillions of dollars
in CDSs. Based on central bank reports, the Bank for International Settlements
reduced worldwide notional amounts to gross market values,75 but it was not
common industry (much less regulatory) knowledge that, for example, AIG
was warehousing risk.76 Similarly, as shown by the systemic consequences of
the Lehman failure, regulators had a grievously incomplete awareness of the
74. Jenny Anderson, U.S. Financial Sector Is Losing Its Edge, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 2007, at C3 (discusing a report released by Mayor Bloomberg and Senator Schumer); COMM. ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT ix (2006), available at
http://capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf ("But the evidence presented
here suggests that the United States is losing its leading competitive position as compared to stock
markets and financial centers abroad."); Rene Stulz, Comment, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY, supra note 29, at 64, 67-68 (noting that instead of responding to "wake up" calls from
unprecedented money market activity in 2007, regulators persisted in deregulatory focus).
75. See Statistical Annex, BIS Q. REV., Sept. 2010, at A121 tbl.19, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/rqal009.pdf. This table is based on quarterly or semi-annual reports
from central banks throughout the world.
76. See COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GP. I, supra note 56, at A-17; Paul Van den
Bergh, Data Issues in the Context of the Recent Financial Turmoil, in IFC BULL. No. 31: MEASURING
FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND ITS IMPACT 515 (2009), available at
http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb3l.pdf (discussing limits on data on CDS). The Fed collects data on
banks and other large derivative dealers, but not "end-users." See Sally Davies, Cross-Border
Derivatives Exposure: How Global Are Derivatives Markets?, in IFC BULL. No. 31, supra note 76, at
159. A recent compilation of the top twenty CDS counterparties did not include AIG in 2006 and put
them at the bottom in 2005, obviously not reflecting its unhedged risk. See David Mengle, Credit
Derivatives: An Overview, FED. RESERVE BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., no. 4, 2007, at 10 tbl.4
(reporting Fitch Credit survey data).
In response to these criticisms, the major industry clearing institution, Depository Trust and
Clearing Corporation ("DTCC"), agreed to make a public release of historical and current data on credit
default swap activity in its Trade Information Warehouse, "the only comprehensive global repository for
the OTC derivatives market." Press Release, Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., Further CDS
Transparency (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.dtcc.com/news/press/releases/2009/further cds_
transparency.php. DTCC now makes available considerably more information, including exposure by
specific "references names," (that is, companies or other entities that have issued debt) and information
on the various indices. See Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., DTCC Deriv/Serve Trade Information
Warehouse Credit Derivatives Data Report Terms of Use Agreement,
http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data-table-i.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2010). Among other
things, it appears that the notional exposure on CDS was overstated by approximately 100%, since the
BIS tallied reports from both sides of the swap, whereas DTCC can avoid such double counting.
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risk incidence from boom-era financial innovations, even after the failure of
Bear Steams put them on notice of systemic fragility just six months earlier.
Political economy factors that inhibit regulatory intervention will thus
operate in many circumstances to increase the likelihood of systemic failure.
Such failures are predictably unpredictable and inescapable.
II. Why Resolution Authority Is an Insufficient Response to Systemic Risk
A. Crafting Resolution Authority for Failing Financial Firms
The dilemma faced by the Fed and the Treasury in confronting Bear
Steams, Lehman, and AIG shows the need for additional resolution authority to
address failing nonbank financial firms of systemic importance. In each case,
the available options were bankruptcy and some form of business combination.
Bankruptcy did not protect the financial system from financial distress; indeed,
it heightened it. Business combination fully protected creditors and partially
protected shareholders, meaning that the firm's capital suppliers were
insufficiently exposed to failure. Thus, the final Dodd-Frank regulatory
reform legislation adopted a new form of resolution authority modeled on the
FDIC's powers in connection with failing banks.
1. The Problems with Bankruptcy
The downside of the bankruptcy option was on full display in the case of
Lehman. As presently constructed, bankruptcy ill-suits the business model of a
financial institution deeply engaged in trading and market making. First, such a
firm depends on collateralized short-term rollover financing for its core
business activities, as well as to finance portfolio positions at a significant
leverage ratio. In order to avoid the systemic distress that could follow from a
cascading series of failures arising from the bankrupt firm's inability to repay
its financing, the Bankruptcy Code provides safe harbors from the automatic
stay for various financial contracts. These include the repurchase agreements
("repos") that are the vehicle for short-term finance.78 Repo creditors can net
out their position with the bankrupt firm, seize pledged collateral, and sell it to
discharge the indebtedness. This step will happen immediately upon the filing.
77. The details of the Fed's exercise of authority with respect to the Bear Steams rescue and
its refusal to rescue Lehman are addressed in Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Avoiding Eight-
Alarm Fires in the Political Economy of Systemic Risk Management (European Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 277/2010, 2010), available at
http://papersssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=l 553880.
78. See Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy
Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv.
641 (2005). Additionally, if the exemption from the automatic stay is reversed or applied in an ad hoc
fashion, the result could be to produce runs at an earlier stage as short-term secured creditors act to





No new creditors will step into the breach, and the firm's business will rapidly
unravel.
Second, a bankrupt firm will stop paying on obligations, both short-term
and long-term, to creditors who may be financially fragile, depending on
market conditions. A consequence of the Lehman bankruptcy, for example, was
the unexpected "breaking of the buck" by the Reserve Fund's MMF, which
held Lehman commercial paper. 79 This action, in turn, devastated the
commercial paper market, as nervous money market participants headed for
Treasury bills. 0 In the case of obligations like swaps, such as CDSs, a
counterparty might well be exposed to unhedged risk that could threaten its
own solvency.
Third, financial contracts are often supported by margin. In other words,
they are partly collateralized. The bankruptcy filing gives a counterparty the
right to terminate the contract, net out its position with the bankrupt party, and
sell the collateral to the extent it is a net obligee. Such termination forces rapid
correlative responses by the bankrupt firm that can reduce the realizable value
from these contracts. Lehman, for example, disposed of over a million contract
positions in the two weeks post-bankruptcy at a supposed opportunity loss of
$75 billion, almost a third of its ultimate loss.8t Even more seriously, the
firesale of collateral by the counterparties of one bankrupt firm can depress
asset values on the books for other market participants and lead to a negative
spiral of credit supply throughout the market.
Fourth, and more generally, bankruptcy is not set up to resolve financial
distress in a time of financial emergency.83 The due process rights of creditors,
both procedural and substantive, are protected in bankruptcy.84 A plan of
79. The Reserve Fund was forced to write off $785 million in Lehman debt, and consequently,
its net asset value dropped to $0.97 per share. See Press Release, The Reserve Fund (Sept. 16, 2008),
available at http://www reservefunds.com/pdfs/Press%20Release%202008 0916.pdf.
80. Following the announcement, other MMFs admitted Lehman-related problems, and
investors pulled more than $170 billion out of the funds in the following week. Steven M. Davidoff &
David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L.
REv. 463, 504-06 (2009).
81. See Jeffrey McCracken, Lehman's Chaotic Bankruptcy Filing Destroyed Billions in Value,
WALL. ST. J., Dec. 29, 2008, at A10.
82. This general problem is modeled in Marcus Miller & Joseph Stiglitz, Leverage and Asset
Bubbles: Averting Armageddon with Chapter II? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
15817, 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1583794.
83. Note that although a broker-dealer must file under Chapter 7 (liquidation) a holding
company that owns a broker-dealer can file under Chapter 11 (reorganization). For Lehman, the holding
company parent filed, but not the U.S. broker-dealer. Part of the negative fallout was because the
applicable U.K. law resulted in the initiation of liquidation of Lehman's U.K. broker-dealer subsidiary,
and unlike in the United States, the failure to segregate customer funds in separate accounts meant those
funds were frozen for a substantial period of time. Tony Lomas, Chairman of Bus. Recovery Grp. at
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Unwinding Lehman Brothers in the U.K., Address at the London School of
Economics' Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis Conference (Jan. 19, 2009) (transcript on file
with authors).
84. "These include formal rights given to creditors' committees, the opportunity of creditors to
object to the terms and timing of asset sales, and indirect control over the debtor through covenants in
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reorganization requires judicial approval. It would be impossible to consult and
negotiate with creditors of a financial firm about a "prepackaged" bankruptcy
without starting a run on the firm. Moreover, when systemic concerns are
important, market conditions may be changing sufficiently rapidly so as to
destabilize negotiations. Similarly, tamping down systemic risk is not high on
the list of bankruptcy goals, which include maximizing the value of the firm,
respecting the bargained-for priorities of the creditors, and assuring equal
treatment of comparably situated parties.
2. The Problems with Business Combinations
A second resolution option is some form of business combination with a
credit-worthy party: either a merger, as in the case of Bear Steams; or a quasi-
takeover, as in the case of AIG.
a. Merger
Merger as a resolution mechanism suffers from two inconvenient
institutional facts. First, mergers under standard U.S. state corporation
statutesss require, at a minimum, approval of those shareholders holding a
majority of outstanding common shares of the target.8 6 This constraint has three
practical entailments. First, target shareholders must receive some appreciable
share of the post-rescue value of the firm as inducement for their consent.
Otherwise, they may roll the dice on the value of the firm in a changed
economic environment. Second, and less obviously, target shareholders get a
free option with respect to the rescue proposal during the proxy solicitation
period, a minimum of forty days under the federal securities law.8 ' This
situation exists because during the post-signing/pre-closing period, someone
needs to guarantee the debts and trading obligations of the rescued firm to
DIP [debtor-in-possession] loan agreements." Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy or
Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 481 (2010).
85. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251 et seq. (2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.01-.04
(2002).
86. Both Delaware law and the Model Business Corporation Act permit acquirers to avoid a
shareholder vote through use of a triangular structure in which the required shareholder approval is
satisfied by the parent's vote of its shares in the acquisition subsidiary. Even if an acquirer does not have
sufficient authorized but unissued common shares, corporate finance statutes and standard planning
mean that the acquirer can use fractional shares of a class of "blank check" preferred stock configured
by board resolution to mimic the economic and governance rights of common shares.
On the other hand, where the acquirer uses as consideration common stock that amounts to 20%
or more of the currently outstanding common stock, a NYSE listing rule requires a shareholder vote
even in the case of a triangular merger. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03(c) (2010). The
disclosure requirements in connection with such a shareholder vote have figured in controversies
associated with the Bank of America-Merrill Lynch merger.
87. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (2006)). Where the jurisdiction's laws insist on an acquirer shareholder vote, deal




avoid its unraveling, and to be effective, this guarantee must cover obligations
entered into during this period even if the merger is subsequently terminated.
Target shareholders can exploit this "bridge guarantee" to look for a better offer
or simply to hope for a turnaround in the economic environment that would let
them renegotiate the deal. In the meantime, the guarantor bears the risk of loss.
Finally, the combination of the first two points means that a merger agreement
probably must contain: (1) deal-forcing provisions, such as "lock-ups,"
designed to deprive target shareholders of effective choice; or (2) compensatory
provisions such as high break fees or uncapped stock options that give the first
bidder a significant payoff from a higher-valuing bid. Otherwise, the bridge
guarantor would bear too much uncompensated-for risk. But the required deal
protections would probably exceed the conventional limits of mergers and
acquisitions law and so require a kind of judicial forbearance. That itself injects
some uncertainty. In other words, the corporate governance provisions of
"merger" create deal uncertainty that makes it much harder to put together a
transaction, as in the case of Lehman.
The second inconvenient institutional fact is the hard-wiring in the merger
statutes that require the acquirer to take on the debts and other obligations of
the target. 8 There is no provision in "merger" for imposing loss-sharing, or
contingent loss-sharing, on any creditor of a financially distressed or insolvent
firm. "Merger" provides no way to distinguish between senior and subordinated
creditors, secured or unsecured, or to require creditors to swap debt for equity
or in any other way facilitate a merger that might well enhance the enterprise
value of the firm. If the acquirer is unwilling to bear such losses or risk of loss
on hard-to-value assets, then a transaction is not possible unless public or
private third parties with systemic interests provide financial assistance.
Similarly, the merger statutes do not permit the acquirer to reject or unilaterally
modify contractual obligations of the target, such as executive compensation
contracts. This fact has played out vividly in the compensation controversies
arising from Bank of America's acquisition of Merrill Lynch, in which
litigation over the disclosure of bonuses may be driven by objections to a "pay
for failure" approach. 9
Both of these structural limitations of "merger" as a resolution mechanism
increase third-party rescue costs. Since the increased costs inure to the benefit
88. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 259; MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.07(a). The Model
Business Corporation Act's Official Comment states: "The survivor automatically becomes the owner of
all real and personal property and becomes subject to all the liabilities, actual or contingent, of each
party merged into it." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.07 cmt. In mergers of industrial firms, use of an
acquisition subsidiary might succeed in insulating the acquirer from some of the liabilities of the target.
In a financial firm merger where trading and banking operations will be consolidated, such insulation
will not be practicable; and of course, if the merger is arranged as a rescue in the midst of a financial
crisis, such liability avoidance could be self-defeating.
89. See Final Consent Judgment as to Defendant Bank of America Corp, SEC v. Bank of
America Corp., No. 09 Civ. 6829 & 10 Civ. 0215 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/boaexanotice.pdf.
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of a failing firm's shareholders and creditors, merger as a resolution mechanism
promotes moral hazard. If the third party is a public entity, the visible limits to
loss-sharing will predictably stir political backlash.
There is an additional inconvenient fact about a "merger" that follows its
accomplishment: the resulting financial firm is bigger. A merger concentrates
systemic risk and may put an implicit government guarantee behind the now
"too big to fail" institution. Moreover, the merger may reduce competition in
the relevant consumer, commercial, and investment banking markets. 90 These
are major long-run costs.
b. Quasi-Takeover
The Fed's assistance to AIG amounted to another kind of business
combination, a quasi-takeover. In exchange for an $85 billion loan, the Fed
took total control rights and equity claims to 79.9% of AIG's profits.91 (The
Fed limited its claim to less than 80% to avoid consolidation of AIG's and the
Fed's balance sheets under applicable accounting rules.) As with a merger,
although shareholders' shares were diluted, all creditors were fully protected,
and there was no easy road to impose loss-sharing on any creditor or any other
contractual claimant. The absence of loss-sharing has become a source of great
controversy. 92
3. The FDIC Resolution Alternative
This Subsection sketches the FDIC's historical resolution authority for
banks and the precedents for its use. It then describes the FDIC's new
resolution authority for nonbank financial firms. It also points to a serious
limitation of resolution authority: it works best in the case of financial firms
that fail because of idiosyncratic reasons and whose failure produces only
isolated consequences. Resolution authority will be inadequate to address
serious financial sector distress if single-firm failure spreads systemically
because of counterparty exposure or similarity risk. 93
90. See, e.g., Dan Fitzpatrick & Robin Sidel, A City Feels the Squeeze in the Age of Mega-
Banks, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2010, at Al (describing competitive pressure exerted by large banks in the
Orlando, Florida banking market).
91. The initial transaction is described in William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (2009). The transaction required AIG board approval but not shareholder
approval because of the use of "blank check" preferred stock to transfer voting rights and cash flow
rights. Id. at 976-77.
92. See The Federal Bailout of AIG: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't
Reform, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector General for the Troubled
Asset Relief Program); CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG
RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT'S EXIT STRATEGY 7-10, 101-28 (2010);
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, FACTORS
AFFECTING EFFORTS To LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG COUNTERPARTIES, 15-20, 28-30 (2009).
93. Note that similarity risk will be increasing in financial firms' exposure to equity market




a. The FDIC's Resolution Authority (Before Dodd-Frank)
The FDIC's core business since its 1933 establishment as an independent
government agency has been the protection of insured depositors at banks and
thrifts ("banks") through the provision of deposit insurance. In furtherance of
that role, it monitors banks against the risk of failure and intervenes in cases of
failed or failing banks as appropriate. At the outset of the financial crisis, the
FDIC insured more than $4 trillion in deposits. This commitment was backed
by an insurance fund of $45 billion raised through assessments on participating
banks and a $30 billion line of credit at the Treasury. Depositors presumably
relied upon an implicit U.S. government guarantee.
The FDIC's resolution authority was built for "banks," not for complex
and systemically important financial institutions, though its basic form provides
a promising starting point. Upon a determination by a bank's supervisor (for
example, the Comptroller of the Currency, a Treasury official, in the case of
nationally chartered banks) that the depository institution has failed or is
failing, the FDIC steps in as either conservator or receiver.94 The usual basis for
such a determination is that the bank is insolvent in either a balance sheet or
going concern sense or nearing insolvency with no prospects for becoming
adequately capitalized. As receiver, the FDIC has the option of liquidating the
bank's assets and simply paying off the insured depositors (which may entail
high losses to other creditors). Instead, the FDIC generally engineers a
"purchase and assumption" transaction: it purchases "bad" assets at a premium
and arranges for a third party, generally a stronger bank, to purchase "good"
assets and assume the insured deposits and certain other liabilities of the failing
bank, aided by FDIC financial support.95 The transaction commonly takes the
form of a "merger" governed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act rather than
state law.
A purchase and assumption can preserve the going concern value of the
failing bank, which can promptly reopen under the purchaser's name. The
"bad" assets can be whittled down over time, with ultimate losses borne by the
insurance fund and creditors whose claims were not assumed by the third-party
bank.96 Thus, while a purchase and assumption transaction may reduce the
Executive compensation is only one conduit for such pressure. Augmenting shareholder power could
well be another.
94. A provision added by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), also gives the
FDIC power to assert a conservatorship or receivership on its own motion.
95. The practice is to transfer all depositor claims, whether or not they are insured.
96. See PATRICIA A. McCoy, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 15.05(3) (2d ed. 2003). A variation on this is the
establishment of a "bridge bank" by which the FDIC transfers the "good" assets and the liabilities into a
new bank, which operates until it can be sold. A bridge bank can be a useful stabilizing technique that
gives the FDIC time to arrange a follow-on sale, and thus, to realize more of the going concern value of
the failing bank.
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losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund and to uninsured creditors, its structure
gives the FDIC significant discretion to disfavor particular creditor claims by
not including them in the transferred liabilities. The nontransferred creditors
will be left with recourse to the receivership only, which will have been
depleted by the assisted assumption.97 But note that amid the clashes among
creditors, any sort of receivership, even a purchase and assumption transaction,
will wipe out the common shareholders and probably the preferred shareholders
as well.98
In most bank resolution cases, the FDIC steps in as receiver. Less
commonly, the FDIC acts as conservator and operates a bank with the objective
of restoring it to solvency. Historically, the FDIC has also had the power to
provide "open bank" assistance, which avoids an adverse finding and
commonly leaves management in place. Shareholders favor conservatorship or
open bank assistance to receivership because of the greater chance of salvaging
some value from their claims. In theory, the choice among receivership,
conservatorship, and open bank assistance should follow a hierarchy of pre-
intervention capital adequacy. During a wave of bank failures in the 1980s, the
FDIC liberally used its open bank assistance powers to resolve failing banks,
particularly the larger ones. In the most salient cases, this had the effect of
minimizing loss-sharing with uninsured depositors, other creditors, and
shareholders. Congress responded with a provision in the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act ("FDICIA") in 1991 that required the
FDIC to resolve cases at the "least cost." This was intended to limit FDIC
assistance to cases where it was necessary to protect the deposit fund and where
such assistance was the least costly resolution method for the Deposit Insurance
Fund.99
There was an important carve-out to the least cost rule: it did not apply to
cases of systemic financial distress where the FDIC, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the Board of Governors agreed that adherence to the rule "would
97. See Russell Manning, Note, Creditors' Remedies Against the FDIC as Receiver of a
Failed National Bank, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1429 (1986). In the 1980s, creditors initially won some victories
against such disparate treatment of creditors of a similar class, but Congress overruled these results in
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103
Stat. 183. The relevant provisions limit creditor claims to the amount that would have been received in a
liquidation, see 12 U.S.C. § 182 1(i)(2) (2006), and specifically permit "supplemental payments" to some
but not all creditors, see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(i)(3)(a). See also Note, Unsecured Creditors of Failed Banks:
It's Not a Wonderful Life, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1052 (1991).
98. In comparing purchase and assumption transactions that try to capture going concern value
with straight liquidations that protect only uninsured deposits, it is important to note that in liquidations,
the FDIC recovers pari passu with uninsured depositors and other unsecured creditors. Thus, a broader
rescue that protects additional creditor claims along with going concern value may not impose higher
costs on the Deposit Insurance Fund. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC
AND THE RTC EXPERIENCE 1980-1994, at 561 (1998).
99. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A). This provision was added by the Federal Deposit Insurance





have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability."'
00
As part of its general anti-bailout program, Dodd-Frank now limits the FDIC's
capacity to provide other than "least costly" assistance to cases in which the
FDIC had been installed as receiver and the assistance was used to wind down
the institution. 101
b. The FDIC's Struggle with "Too Big To Fail"
The events that led to congressional curbs on a too-forgiving FDIC
resolution practice more than twenty years ago are hauntingly similar to current
events. That era's crisis was the imminent failure of Continental Illinois, then
the seventh largest U.S. bank by assets. 102 In the 1976-1981 period, Continental
was the banking sector's star performer, trebling assets and doubling its stock
price, principally through aggressive growth of its commercial and industrial
lending. It ran aground in 1982 due to large purchases of participations in
defaulting oil and gas loans originated by Penn Square Bank of Oklahoma and
exposure to shaky emerging market economy debt. Nevertheless, it was a
general deterioration in confidence rather than fresh adverse news that triggered
a run by Continental's wholesale credit suppliers in May 1984.03 The Fed
provided liquidity, the FDIC provided "open bank" assistance in the form of
subordinated notes, a group of large commercial banks provided a substantial
bridge loan, and, most controversially, the FDIC promised to protect all
depositors and creditors without regard for the insured deposit cap (then
$100,000) while a "permanent solution" through merger could be found. No
white knight emerged, and deposit outflows continued. Two months later, the
FDIC resolved the case by purchasing a large chunk of Continental's troubled
assets ($4.5 billion, approximately 10% of the bank's total assets) and infusing
$1 billion into the bank's holding company parent, taking an 80% equity
stake.'04 There seemed to be no practical way to rescue the bank without
protecting the creditors of the holding company as well. 05
100. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii).
101. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1106(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2125 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5613) (amending § 13(c)(4)(G) of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)).
102. This discussion follows chapter seven, Continental Illinois and 'Too Big To Fail', in FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES-LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 235 (1997). See also FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 98, at 545-65.
103. Continental had approximately $3 billion in insured deposits and $40 billion in assets,
making it more dependent on wholesale funding than Citigroup. Id.
104. The FDIC began selling off its equity position in 1986, two years after the rescue, but the
final divestiture occurred only in 1991. Ultimately, the rescue of Continental cost the FDIC $1.1 billion,
3.28% of Continental's assets at the time of the intervention. Id. The shareholders eventually
surrendered their position. Id.
105. First, holding company bonds included a covenant that barred dilution of the parent's
100% ownership stake in the bank subsidiary without bondholder consent. These debt instruments were
widely held throughout the world, often in bearer form, making consent difficult to obtain. Second, the
holding company was a funding intermediary for the bank in the wholesale credit market. It funneled
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The alternative to such a resolution, which protected all creditors and left
shareholders with some chance of an upside, was a straightforward liquidation:
sell off the assets, pay off the insured depositors, pay the remaining creditors
the residual, and move on. The reasons for the rescue of Continental Illinois
and of many other large banks in the 1980s were many. These included
concerns about systemic risk of national and international dimensions, the
logistical challenges of liquidating a large bank, the knock-on effects on other
banks, and the disruptive tying-up of uninsured depositor funds during a
liquidation proceeding.
The systemic risk concern is paramount to explaining the FDIC's strategy
for Continental. Among other things, Continental's correspondent banks had
heavily invested in Continental; in the era before interstate banking, local banks
funneled capital to money-center banks for the presumably higher rates of
return than those available on local loans. Continental's failure would have
imposed significant losses on dozens of other banks, producing a number of
follow-on failures and tying up bank capital during the liquidation process. As
the then-Comptroller of the Currency put it:
We [the FDIC directors, the Fed chair, the Secretary of the Treasury] debated at
some length how to handle the Continental situation.... In our collective
judgment, had Continental failed and been treated in a way in which depositors
and creditors were not made whole, we could very well have seen a national, if
not an international, financial crisis the dimensions of which were difficult to
106
imagine. None of us wanted to find out.
The bank rescues of the 1980s led to a debate over "too big to fail" that in
turn eventually produced the "least costly" resolution strategy of FDICIA,
along with its exception for cases of systemic distress.' 0 7 The legislative change
those funds to the bank in the form of deposits, which it drew down to pay creditors. Thus, the FDIC's
protection of bank depositors would inure to the benefit of a substantial group of the holding company's
creditors. With foresight, presumably the FDIC could have carved out such intercompany deposits from
its blanket protection. Id
106. Inquiry into Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois National Bank: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. Supervision, Regulation & Ins. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin.
& Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 287-88 (1984) [hereinafter H. Subcomm. Inquiry]. As was pointed
out by Chairman St. Germain, the government's overall aid package included $7.5 billion in Fed
discount window borrowing. Id. at 289. Tallying up to include the private banking parties' assistance,
the total rescue package was $17 billion. Id.
107. The major effect of the legislative change appears to have been to end the growing use of
an "essentiality" test, which invited the FDIC to give significant weight to regional and even local
factors rather than systemic concerns. The pre-FDICIA version of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) permitted
the FDIC to expend more than the cost of liquidation "in any case where the Corporation determines that
the continued operation of such insured depository institution is essential to provide adequate depository
services to its community." The legislative record suggests that many members were more offended by
the disparate treatment of large banks-whose depositors were commonly fully protected-and small
banks-where protection was commonly limited to insured depositors-than they were by the moral




produced some operational changes at the FDIC. Over the 1986-1991 period,
the height of open bank assistance, uninsured depositor losses in resolution
cases averaged approximately 12%; in the period immediately following, 1992-
1994, the average losses were 65%.1os Nevertheless, the precedents of 1980-
1991 seemed to establish that depositors in large banks would be fully
protected against loss, whether or not they were insured. o0 The modification of
FDIC authority in the FDICIA did not really change that proposition for
depositors in the largest banks, which were most likely to be found
systemically critical." 0
The lessons become somewhat more complicated in the case of a bank
holding company ("BHC"). In the Continental case, BHC creditors were fully
protected, as were parent credit advances to the banking subsidiary (styled
"deposits"). In the 1991 case involving the Bank of New England Corporation,
the results were significantly different. The FDIC did not protect the parent
BHC bondholders or include parent credit advances in the liabilities transferred
to the bridge banks that took over the banking subsidiaries."' The Bank of New
England Corporation filed for bankruptcy, and the bondholders were left to
fight out the allocation of the receivership estate in litigation against the FDIC
that was finally settled almost eight years later." 2 Still, the bondholder claims
were relatively small in both absolute ($700 million) and relative terms. Of the
$22.7 billion in liabilities carried on the BHC's consolidated balance sheet,
$21.3 billion in liabilities were associated with the banking subsidiaries, and all
but the BHC credit claims were fully taken over by the bridge banks.
The gap in the FDIC's resolution authority in the case of large, complex
financial institutions resulted from two important developments. First, some of
the core functions of "banking" shifted to nonbank financial firms. Brokerage
firms like Lehman performed financial intermediation and maturity
transformation, yet because they themselves did not hold insured deposits, they
Rep. Wylie) (referring to "serious policy question" about the existence of a "dual system" in which
Continental is saved while "smaller community banks ... in the Midwest have been allowed to fail").
Another significant change was to restrict the Fed's capacity to engage in below-the-radar
bailouts of troubled banks through use of the Fed window. In making such loans, the Fed would take the
best collateral, which exposed the FDIC to greater risk.
108. Id. at 253.
109. In an important post-Continental 1991 case involving the Bank of New England
Corporation, the FDIC created bridge banks for all three banking subsidiaries (using power provided in
1987 by the Competitive Equality Banking Act) and fully protected all bank depositors relying
principally on essentiality grounds. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 98, at 635-40.
110. Indeed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act may have
perversely encouraged deposit migration from regional banks to money-center banks or, alternatively,
may have encouraged the roll-up of regional banks into national banks, because of the cost of funds
advantage associated with the implicit deposit guarantee.
111. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 98, at 635-40. The FDIC conceded the different
treatment of uninsured depositors in large bank failures, as compared to small bank failures. Id. at 650-
51.
112. See Steve Bailey & Steven Syre, Bank of New England Reaches Accord with FDIC:
Creditors Would Receive $140 Million, Bos. GLOBE, Sept. 19, 1998, at Fl .
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were outside the banking system. Second, the administrative unwinding and
then legislative repeal of Glass-Steagall's separation of banking and investment
banking dramatically increased the balance sheet complexity of large financial
firms. The financial sector deregulation in the 1999 Graham-Leach-Bliley
legislation was flawed in not considering how the expansion of BHC balance
sheets would affect the FDIC's capacity to resolve failing banking firms,
particularly in light of the resolution difficulties posed by much simpler BHC
cases. The tough question for the FDIC with respect to uninsured deposits in a
failing bank becomes a problem of a different dimension when major banks are
part of financial conglomerates and are all funded, even at the bank level,
through wholesale credit markets rather than retail deposits.
c. The FDIC's New Resolution Authority and Its Shortfalls
The FDIC received important new resolution authority for failing nonbank
financial institutions, styled "Orderly Liquidation Authority," in Title II of
Dodd-Frank. 113 Upon an appropriate determination by the Secretary of the
Treasury, following recommendations by the Fed and the FDIC,114 regarding
the impact of a particular financial firm's impending failure on "financial
stability in the United States,"' 5 the FDIC is to step in as receiver, preempting
the role of a bankruptcy court.' This new authority is similar to the FDIC's
powers with respect to a failing bank, with important limitations. The FDIC's
mission is the "orderly liquidation" of the financial firm, not a conservatorship
or open bank assistance." 7 The "mandatory terms and conditions" of the
113. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 201-217, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442-1520.
114. Two-thirds of the Governors of the Federal Reserve Board and two-thirds of the FDIC
board must concur in the recommendation. Id. § 203. Where the largest U.S. subsidiary of the failing
entity is a broker or dealer, the SEC's recommendation is required. Where the largest subsidiary is an
insurance company, the Director of the Federal Insurance Office (a new position), must approve. Id.
§ 203(a)(1)(B)-(C).
115. Id. § 203(b). The Secretary also needs to make various other determinations, including
that other available resolution methods (for example, bankruptcy) would be inadequate, that "no viable
private sector alternative is available," and that the proposed resolution would "avoid or mitigate ...
adverse effects" on "claims or interests of creditors, counterparties and shareholders of the [resolved]
financial company and other market participants," taking into account the cost to Treasury and the
potential to "increase excessive risk taking on the part of creditors, counterparties, and shareholders." Id.
The broad range of factors that the Secretary should consider seems aimed at broadening the resolution
strategies.
116. Id. § 202(c)(2). If the firm's board does not consent to the FDIC's receivership, the
Secretary of the Treasury can confidentially petition the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
for imposition of an involuntary receivership. Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii). The scope of review is narrow:
only whether the Secretary's determination that the financial company is "covered" by the Act, "is in
danger of default," is "arbitrary and capricious." Id. "Danger of default" includes an impending
bankruptcy filing, losses (or likely losses) that will unavoidably deplete a firm's capital, and insolvency
(or likely insolvency) on either a balance sheet or equity (going concern) basis. Id. § 203(c)(4).
117. Id. §§ 204(a), 206, 214. For an initial comparison of the FDIC's powers in the resolution
of a failing bank with its powers in this "orderly liquidation" process, see DAVIS POLK, SUMMARY OF
THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON
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liquidation require that the intervention be necessary for "financial stability,"
not "for preserving the covered financial company."" 8 The liquidation must be
structured to impose any losses on unsecured creditors" 9 and shareholders
(who are paid last),120 and the management and board members "responsible
for the failed condition" of the firm must be removed. 121 Amounts owed to
highly compensated employees are treated as unsecured claims in the recovery
pecking order,122 and the FDIC may repudiate employment contracts.' 23 The
FDIC cannot take any "equity interest" in the firm. 124 Nevertheless, it has broad
authority to provide financing to facilitate the firm's liquidation, which
includes extending credit, purchasing assets, and assuming or guaranteeing
obligations.125 The FDIC can also establish a "bridge financial company,"
presumably to protect the viable business and sound assets of a failing financial
firm pending a subsequent sale.126 Even though the FDIC cannot take on equity
interests, it can provide operating funds "in lieu of capital" to a bridge financial
127 1 28
company and can provide financing to facilitate a subsequent sale. For the
receivership and the bridge financial company, the maximum term of the
FDIC's mandate, including potential extensions, is five years.129
In effect, the FDIC will provide a special kind of "debtor in possession"
financing to protect the financial system while the failing firm is wound down
or sold via the bridge company mechanism. As for the actual funding, Dodd-
Frank provides for an "Orderly Liquidation Fund," supplied by Treasury
borrowings.130 This Fund is not capped and requires no legislative action for
JULY 21, 2010, at 27-34 (July 21, 2010), available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/efb9442899114472b5dd006e9c6185bb/Presentation/Publica
tionAttachment/efd835f6-2014-4a48-832d-00aa2a4e3fdd/0709 10_FinancialReformSummary.pdf.
Despite the emphasis on "liquidation," the FDIC is also directed "to take account actions to avoid or
mitigate potential adverse effects on low income, minority, or underserved communities affected by the
failure of the covered financial company," Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act § 209(n)(9), a loophole of potentially large scope.
118. Id. §206(l).
119. Id. § 206(3); see also id. §§ 209(o)(1)(D)(i), 210(a)(1)(M), 210(b)(1), (5).
120. Id. § 206(2).
121. Id. § 206(4), (5). Individuals are also subject to liability for negligence. Id. § 2 10(f).
122. Id. § 210(b)(1)(C), (D), (G).
123. Id. § 210(c)(1), (7)(C).
124. Id. § 206(6).
125. Id. §204(d).
126. See supra note 109 (discussing bridge banks).
127. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 210(h)(2)(G)(iv).
128. Id. § 210(h)(9). The power to use a bridge company to facilitate a resolution means that
the FDIC is highly likely (in practice) to attempt to preserve the entity as a going concern, pending an
eventual sale, rather than to "liquidate" it.
129. The initial maximum term of a receivership is three years, but the FDIC can obtain two
one-year extensions with appropriate findings. Id. § 202(d). The initial term of a bridge financial
company is two years, but the FDIC can extend its status for three one-year periods. Id. § 210(h)(12). It
appears that the time periods of "receivership" and "bridge financial company status" do not tack. On
the other hand, the maximum repayment period on Treasury borrowings to fund the resolution is five
years. Id. § 210(o)(1)(B).
130. Id. § 210(n).
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unlimited borrowing, though it is subject to debt ceiling constraints. The FDIC
also has the authority to guarantee any obligations of the failing company that
were issued during the receivership.131 Thus, the Fund can be leveraged by
liberal use of the FDIC's guarantee authority.1 32 The Fund, including
disbursements on guarantees, will be repaid through the proceeds of asset sales
and other dispositions, as well as authorized recoveries. An ex post risk-based
assessment on systemically important financial firms will cover any
shortfalls.' 33
Under Dodd-Frank, an FDIC receivership displaces not only bankruptcy
but also other potential sources of government financial assistance for a failing
firm. In particular, the legislation eliminates the Fed's emergency authority to
lend to specific firms. The Fed's section 13(3) emergency lending authority is
limited to "broadly available" facilities rather than "single and specific"
borrowers; its lending must aim to provide "liquidity to the financial system,
and not to aid a failing financial company"; and its loans may not be made to
"insolvent" borrowers.134 Moreover, any such Fed program requires the prior
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.135
There are many things to admire in this effort to provide for the orderly
winding up of a failing financial firm. Among other things, it avoids the
anomalous results of a merger, which fully protects creditors and partially saves
otherwise worthless shareholder claims. It provides for a smoother path to the
liquidation of a failing financial firm than an abrupt dissolution like Lehman's.
It also rests accountability for specific resolution decisions with the executive
branch rather than with the Fed, thereby somewhat insulating the Fed from
responsibility for any ensuing political fallout.
Nevertheless, the resolution authority provided by Dodd-Frank is
seriously flawed. The anti-bailout rhetoric that seized Congress in the course of
the bill's enactment has resulted in a resolution strategy that could well increase
the probability of a systemic financial crisis and will result in nationalization of
a substantial part of the financial sector should one occur. This potential
outcome is the case for two principal reasons: first, the lack of any pre-funding
of the Orderly Liquidation Fund will lead regulators to postpone intervention
with techniques that are likely to foster financial instability; second, the
stringent constraints on government financial support of firms not in FDIC
131. Id. § 204(d).
132. Id. For example, the FDIC used two guarantee programs to provide systemic support
during the recent financial crisis, the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program and the Transaction
Account Guarantee Program. The total commitment was approximately $1.5 trillion. See FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CoRP., TEMPORARY LIQUIDITY GUARANTEE PROGRAM: SECOND QUARTER 2009, at tbls.III-C &
IV-C (2009), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2009jun/qbptlgp.html.
133. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 210(n)(9)(B), 210(o),
214.
134. Id. § 1101(a).




receivership will drive firms into receivership. The exclusivity of receivership,
combined with an uncapped Orderly Liquidation Fund as augmented by the
FDIC's guarantee authority, makes the nationalization of much of the financial
sector the likely outcome of a financial crisis. Beyond the questionable wisdom
of this nationalization strategy, the anticipation of nationalization will itself
hasten financial crises.
Lack of pre-funding. The legislation initially passed by the House
contained a $150 billion "Systemic Dissolution Fund" pre-funded through risk-
based assessments on large financial firms.'36 Senator Dodd's "chairman's
mark" proposed an Orderly Liquidation Fund of $50 billion, similarly pre-
funded.13 7 Attacked as fostering "bailouts," this industry pre-funding was
stripped from the final Senate legislation, and the Senate's version prevailed in
the Conference Committee. Thus, Dodd-Frank contains no industry pre-
funding. Resolution funds will be borrowed from the Treasury and, ultimately,
the taxpayers. Politically, this will likely register as a taxpayer "bailout,"
notwithstanding the strong repayment mandate. The Treasury (read: taxpayer)
funding comes up front, when the public is in a politically "hot" state.
Repayment comes later. As with TARP, repayment of most of the outlays will
not change the public's initial impressions. Regulators will therefore be hesitant
to go this route and are likely to delay putting a troubled financial firm into
receivership. Instead, they may engage in various forms of regulatory
forbearance and nonemergency Fed discount window lending in the hopes of
avoiding a firm's insolvency. The high political cost of "taxpayer funding" as
opposed to industry pre-funding is reflected in the FDIC's decision-in the
midst of the financial crisis-to augment the dwindling Deposit Insurance Fund
by raising bank assessments rather than borrowing from the Treasury.' 38 The
savings-and-loan crisis provides the roadmap for regulators who want to
"finesse" the problems of failing financial firms to avoid the use of taxpayer
funds.139
The lack of pre-funding will therefore have systemic consequences. By
the time regulators put a failing firm into receivership, the particular firm will
be in a greater loss position, potentially enhancing contagion effects. The
pursuit of ultimately unsustainable risk-taking, prolonged in part by regulatory
forbearance, may render the entire financial sector less stable.
Potential resolution funding shortfall. Although the Orderly Liquidation
Fund is not capped and may be augmented by FDIC guarantees, Dodd-Frank
may nevertheless provide inadequate funding for the orderly resolution of
136. H.R. 4173, Il1lth Cong. § 1609 (2009).
137. S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 210(n) (2010) (Chairman's mark).
138. Eric Lipton, F.D.I.C. Increases Fees To Insure Deposit Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2009, at B4.
139. LAWRENCE J. WHrrE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND
THRIFT REGULATION (1991).
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individual firms. The bill imposes two firm-specific borrowing limits: first, for
funds drawn down during the first thirty days of the receivership, borrowing
cannot exceed 10% of the firm's consolidated assets (based on the most recent
financial statements); second, for funds drawn down thereafter, borrowing
cannot exceed 90% of the "fair value" of the assets "available for
repayment." 4 0 The denominators of these measures will be quite different. For
the first cap, applicable balance-sheet valuations are unlikely to be fully marked
down to reflect market valuations and would not reflect the effects of the
resolution process. For the second cap, the denominator will be much less,
since "fair value" suggests current market valuations and "available for
repayment" seems to exclude assets subject to security interests because
secured creditors are not subject to loss-sharing. The potential shortfalls created
by these caps could destabilize the FDIC resolution process.
For AIG, for example, the differences between the denominators would be
meaningful, and the shortfall issues are evident. As of December 2007, AIG's
consolidated balance-sheet assets were roughly $1.1 trillion, 10% of which is
$110 billion. 14 This amount would cover the initial Fed loans of approximately
$85 billion but not the ultimate Treasury-Fed commitment of $185 million.
Under the post-thirty day cap, matters are more complex. Of the nearly $1.1
trillion in assets, approximately $800 billion appears to be associated with
insurance or otherwise secured liabilities not available for repayment. 142 The
potential valuation haircut associated with the remaining $300 billion in assets
in the depths of the financial crisis is not clear, but under Dodd-Frank, the "fair
value" of those assets would need to be at least $205 billion to justify the
funding commitment thought necessary in the fall of 2008.143
Resolution authority and systemic crisis. Resolution authority works best
if the reasons for the firm's failure are "idiosyncratic," meaning firm-specific.
It may also work for a particular model of systemic distress: contagion from a
single firm's failure that spreads because of counterparty risk and other
linkages. In theory, if Lehman's dissolution had been orderly instead of abrupt,
various other financial players would not have faced dire risk and uncertainty
from the hanging contracts, defaulted obligations, and inaccessible funds that
140. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 210(n)(6).
141. See Am. Int'l Gp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), item 8 (Dec. 31, 2007) (signed Feb.
28, 2008) (Financial Statements and Supplementary Data).
142. See id. (showing calculations based on categorization of balance-sheet liabilities).
143. One response might be that an AIG recurrence could be "resolved" with much smaller
cash outlays if the FDIC repudiates various credit default swap contracts or simply refuses to post the
additional collateral required by CDS agreements, leaving the parties to file a claim in the receivership.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 210(c). Whether the FDIC wants to
take such actions may depend on knock-on systemic effects on counterparties. Moreover, insofar as the
counterparty is a clearinghouse (Dodd-Frank heavily promotes their use), the Act requires the FDIC to
use its "best efforts" to avoid threatening the stability of these market-critical institutions. Id.
§ 21 0(c)(8)(G). Alternatively, the FDIC could liberally use its guarantee authority in place of cash




disrupted the relationships among the survivors. The FDIC's receivership
power is aimed at reducing such contagion from a single firm's failure. Indeed,
Dodd-Frank requires firms to construct "living wills" that provide a roadmap
for their liquidation.1
But the recent financial crisis powerfully demonstrated two things. First,
financial regulators and firms are unlikely to have a perfect understanding of
the global linkages and interdependencies that give rise to serious contagion
effects. For example, in considering the consequences of a Lehman failure,
U.S. regulators did not appreciate the U.K. broker-dealer resolution regime.
The regulators may not know whether or not loss imposition will damage
systemically important creditors. Consequently, the knock-on effects of even a
well-handled resolution can be substantial. Second, many significant firms are
exposed to the additional systemic risk of "similarity" (or "commonality"),
which is not necessarily avoided by the adroit resolution of a particular troubled
firm. 4 In the recent financial crisis, the securitized assets on the balance sheets
of many large financial firms were abruptly revalued. Many firms were
revealed to be insolvent or on the verge of insolvency and needed to be
recapitalized. Firm-by-firm resolution, as Dodd-Frank envisions, would fail to
abate such a crisis; it would produce a series of falling dominos.
Nationalization as Dodd-Frank's systemic support strategy. What are
regulators' options under Dodd-Frank in the event of financial distress that
severely affects not just one or two major firms, but many significant firms in
the financial sector? Neither Dodd-Frank itself nor the relatively brief floor
debates of the conference report articulate a strategy to address a financial
crisis.146 But a strategy emerges when the different pieces are put together. It is
the nationalization of much of the financial sector. First, recall that the Orderly
Liquidation Fund and the FDIC's guarantee authority in receivership are
uncapped. Second, Dodd-Frank eliminates alternative sources of support to
troubled financial firms that might otherwise be provided by the Fed or the
FDIC, making receivership the exclusive firm-specific support mechanism in a
financial emergency. This presumably reflects the drafters' desire to avoid
bailouts and financial firms that are "too big to fail." Therefore, absent
emergency congressional lawmaking, the price of financial assistance will be
an FDIC receivership. This situation means that in a financial crisis, the only
way that regulators will be able to provide widespread support to troubled firms
in the financial sector will be by imposing receivership on the recipients. The
outcome of multiple receiverships of large financial firms will be the
nationalization of much of the financial sector. The term of FDIC receivership
144. Id. §§ 112(a)(2)(I), 1 15(b)(1)(D), 1 15(d)(1).
145. See supra Subsection I.A.2. For example, in the effort to emulate the most successful
firms, other firms may follow similar business strategies, now revealed to contain critical weaknesses.
146. See 156 CONG. REc. S5869-5933 (daily ed. July 15, 2010); 156 CoNG. REC. S5797-5845
(daily ed. July 14, 2010); 156 CONG. REC. H5212-5261 (daily ed. June 30, 2010).
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or control of a bridge bank could be up to five years, which portends an
extensive period of FDIC superintendence of the financial sector. All this may
be an unwelcome surprise to those who applauded the avoidance of financial
sector nationalization between the fall of 2008 and the spring of 2009, but it
seems to be the inevitable consequence of Dodd-Frank.
This conclusion falls out in part because Dodd-Frank constrains
alternative means of financial support from both the Fed and FDIC. First, the
Fed's emergency lending authority under section 13(3) is limited in several
ways. The Fed can no longer lend to a single firm. Rather, any lending must be
pursuant to a "program or facility with broad-based eligibility,"l4 7 and the
program cannot be tailored to target a specific firm; it shall instead be
"designed to ensure that any emergency lending program or facility is for the
purpose of providing liquidity to the financial system, and not to aid a failing
financial company."l 48 Moreover, there is renewed emphasis on assuring that a
firm's collateral "is sufficient to protect taxpayers from losses." 4 9 The lending
reserve bank must assign a "lendable value to all collateral" accepted into the
program. As part of the effort to assure that no financial support is provided to
a failing firm, the CEO of the would-be borrower must certify that the firm is
not "insolvent."150 In short, the Fed cannot lend except upon good collateral
from a firm that is not otherwise failing.15 1
This new provision, of course, would rule out assistance to AIG, Bear
Stearns, Lehman, Citigroup, and Bank of America, all candidates for Fed
assistance in the fall of 2008, whether or not the collateral that supported their
loans was good. Presumably, the FDIC's resolution authority is meant squarely
to address such cases, but the emphasis on adequate collateral could well
undermine the Fed's ability to create lending facilities that provide widespread
support to the financial sector. For example, in November 2008, the Fed
created the Term Asset Loan Facility ("TALF"). TALF provided five-year
nonrecourse loans, collateralized by asset-backed securities rated at the highest
investment grade by rating agencies. The goal was to restart the asset-based
securitization market, a major source of financing for consumer credit and
financial and nonfinancial businesses. During early 2009, the Fed expanded the
pool of eligible collateral to include residential and commercial MBSs, as well
as loans backed by leases or other loans related to various sorts of business
147. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § I 101(a)(6).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. There is some wiggle room here since "insolvent" is narrowly defined to refer to a
firm as to which a formal insolvency proceeding has begun.
151. The lending program must also be approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, id., but this




expenditures.152 The Fed committed up to $1 trillion to this program. The funds
were lent on a nonrecourse basis precisely because of the valuation risk
associated with such securities in the midst of the crisis. There was real risk
that the collateral was insufficient. The Fed's risk was covered with a $20
billion TARP allocation. 153
It would be a mistake to assume that Fed officials will necessarily strain to
find authority to intervene in the next financial crisis. If one lesson learned
from the Great Depression was the need for aggressive action by the Fed to
sustain and expand liquidity-a lesson that influenced Fed behavior in
2008 154-the lesson learned this time around was that Fed officials and civil
servants face the risk of highly critical second-guessing of their good-faith
decisions. 155
In addition to constraining financial support from the Fed, Dodd-Frank
restricts the FDIC loan guarantee authority except for firms that are in
receivership. Previously, the FDIC had broad authority to provide assistance to
depository institutions without imposing a receivership in the event that such
152. The program is described on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's website. Credit
and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst lendingother.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2010).
153. See Brian Sack, Exec. V.P., Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the New York
Association for Business Economics's Reflections on the TALF and the Federal Reserve's Role as
Liquidity Provider (June 9, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2010/saclOO609.html).
Other Fed emergency programs designed to cushion the fallout from the Lehman bankruptcy
would also be at risk under the Dodd-Frank limits. For example, the Commercial Paper Funding
Facility, which in effect opened the Fed's discount window to issuers of commercial paper, substituted
where firms were unable to post the collateral typically accepted by the Fed. Tobias Adrian, Karin
Kimbough & Dina Marchioni, The Federal Reserve's Commercial Paper Funding Facility, FED. RES.
BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL. REv. 8-9 (2010), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/forthcoming/1006adri.pdf (forthcoming). Similarly, the Money
Market Investor Funding Facility, which made the Fed the buyer of last resort of money market
instruments held by a MMF, focused on the quality of the instruments purchased, not the solvency of the
seller, and stretched customary standards. See Money Market Investor Funding Facility: Frequently
Asked Questions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/mmiff faq.html
(last updated June 25, 2009).
Despite the prior general notice in the program descriptions, the more detailed December 1, 2010
disclosures of liberalized collateral accepted by the Fed's liquidity programs attracted significant public
attention. See, e.g., David Benoit, Government Programs Accepted Low-Rated Assets, WALL ST. J.
ONuNE, Dec. 1, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703865004575649153243730686.html; Francesco
Guerrera & Robin Harding, Crisis-Hit Banks Flooded Fed with Junk, FT.COM, Dec. 2, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/fe8a477a-fe52-1ldf-abac-00144feab49a.html#axzzl7vghWIPl; Ben Protess,
How Banks Pawned Junk to the Fed, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Dec. 2, 2010, 2:01 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/how-banks-pawned-junk-to-the-fed/.
154. See DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE'S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC
40-48 (2009) (describing widespread criticism of Fed's role in turning a "bad late-1920s recession into
the Great Depression" and citing Bemanke's 2002 speech at an event honoring Milton Friedman:
"Regarding the Great Depression. You're right, we did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't
do it again.").
155. See sources supra note 92. Many other aspects of the Treasury and Fed's efforts to
stabilize the financial system have been criticized in reports and testimony of the Congressional
Oversight Panel and the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
197
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 28.1, 2011
"action or assistance would avoid or mitigate" "serious adverse effects on
economic conditions or financial stability."' 56  The FDIC construed this
authority liberally in its initiation of a broad-based debt guarantee program in
November 2008.157 One leg of the program guaranteed new issuances of senior
unsecured debt by depository institutions and their holding companies or
finance affiliates. Up to $800 billion in guarantees were authorized, at least
$340 billion of which were drawn down. The FDIC also guaranteed all
noninsured bank deposits in noninterest-bearing accounts.' 59 The authorization
for this "Transaction Account Guarantee Program" was approximately $900
billion, over $700 billion of which was committed.160 To get a sense of the
scale of these programs, recall that the full TARP authorization was $700
billion. The FDIC program, if relatively unheralded, was a major element of the
financial sector stabilization program in the fall of 2008 and the spring of 2009.
Dodd-Frank eliminates the FDIC's authority to issue debt guarantees, save
two exceptions. First, the FDIC may issue guarantees in conjunction with a
receivership.161 Second, the FDIC may issue guarantees as part of a widely
available program that has received prior congressional approval. 162 In other
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2006). FDIC declaration of the systemic emergency that
triggered such authority required concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Board of
Governors.
157. The "Temporary Liquidity Program" consisted of two elements: the Transaction Account
Guarantee Program, through which the FDIC guaranteed all noninterest-bearing bank deposits, and the
Debt Guarantee Program. See Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 12 C.F.R. pt. 370 (2008).
158. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 132, at tbl.IV-C.
159. These were probably mostly corporate deposits, since the vestige of prior caps on the
interest that banks can pay depositors (so-called "Regulation Q") is the prohibition on paying interest on
corporate demand deposits. See 12 U.S.C. § 371a (2006).
160. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 132, at tbl.III-C.
161. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. Ill-
203, § 1106(b), 124 Stat. 1376.
162. Id. §§ 1105, 1106(a). The guarantee program "may not include the provision of equity in
any form." Id. § 1105(a).
There is an interesting legislative story here. The House-passed version granted authority for
such an FDIC program upon approval of a "Financial Services Oversight Council," but such authority
would sunset in 2013 unless the President made a "fast-track" request to Congress. H.R. 4173, 11Ith
Cong. § 1109 (2009). (The House version would have required stock warrants from the benefited firms
in compensation. Id. § 1110.) The Senate Finance Committee version of the bill, S. 3217, the more
direct precursor to the Dodd-Frank provision, broadly authorized the FDIC to "guarantee obligations of
solvent insured depository institutions" (and the relevant holding company and other affiliates) subject
to a congressional joint resolution of disapproval. See S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 1155 (2010). As stated in
the accompanying report: "The Secretary will determine a maximum amount of guarantees, and the
President may request Congress to allow that amount. If the President does not submit the request, the
guarantees will not be made. Congress has 5 days to disapprove the request ..... S. REP. NO. 111-176,
at 183 (2010). Such a joint resolution is, like any other law, subject to the customary procedures of
bicameralism and presentment, meaning subject to a presidential veto. So under the Senate Committee
version, unless each chamber could produce a two-thirds majority against the FDIC's program, it would
go forward. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
The final Senate bill reversed the order of FDIC and Congressional action. The FDIC (the
President) must still make a request, but issuance of guarantees is subject to congressional authorization,
meaning both chambers must approve or the guarantee request fails. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
§ 1155(c)(l)-(2), (d). The final version of the legislation, Dodd-Frank, picks up the Senate-passed
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words, to provide financial support to "solvent" financial firms in a time of
"severe economic distress," the FDIC must make its case to Congress.
Unlike in the case of TARP, the FDIC will not be able to claim that it
lacks other means of supporting critical firms because receivership provides the
alternative. "Receivership" is likely to seem more attractive to Congress than
any program that could be labeled a "bailout." As the request must formally
come from the President,' 63 the President will politically own the "bailout."
Size matters too. In the fall of 2008, for example, the FDIC authorized
loan guarantees of $1.7 trillion, a commitment that might not sail through
Congress. Moreover, the effort to persuade Congress to approve substantial
guarantee authority may, like TARP, become an independent source of
economic disruption, since such a high visibility political moment may drive
negative economic expectations. Receivership of troubled financial firms is the
path of least resistance; it avoids economic collapse at the least political cost.
This dynamic is likely to produce the nationalization of a broad swath of
financial firms that may otherwise fail to meet their funding and liquidity needs
and become insolvent.16 4
The consequences of the nationalization strategy. Dodd-Frank's financial
sector nationalization strategy will alter the behavior of firms and regulators in
three periods: 1) the period of relative stability prior to financial distress, 2) the
period of systemic financial instability itself, and 3) the post-nationalization
recovery period. Prior to instability, the threat of nationalization may well
reduce risk-taking by financial firms because of the desire of shareholders and
creditors to avoid significant losses. This presumably will reduce the risk of
procedure. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1105(c)(1)-(2), (d). Dodd-Frank prescribes a "fast track"
procedure for the Senate consideration of the FDIC request, see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act § 1105(d), but should the Senate decide to vary those rules, the constitutional
protection of each chamber's prerogative to make its own rules would prevail, as the legislation
acknowledges. Id. § 1105(d)(3)(D). There is no comparable fast track requirement for the House, since
the parallel provision in the Senate Committee version, id § 1155(d)(1), was deleted in the final Senate
bill.
There is also an important technical question as to how far Dodd-Frank cuts back the FDIC's
current guarantee authority. The FDIC styled its Temporary Liquidity Program ("TLP") as having two
elements, the Transaction Account Guarantee Program and the Debt Guarantee Program. See sources
cited supra note 132. Section 1106(a) withdraws the FDIC's existing authority "to establish any widely
available debt guarantee program for which § 1105 would provide authority." Could it be claimed that
§ 1106(a) addressed only the "debt guarantee" element of the FDIC's program, leaving it free to
guarantee deposits? We think the answer is probably "no." A deposit, even if in a noninterest-bearing
transaction account, is a "debt," and the TLP widely guaranteed such debts, in addition to other debt
obligations. Moreover, § 1105, which authorizes "a widely available program to guarantee obligations of
solvent depository institutions" certainly "would provide authority" for a "Transaction Guarantee
Program."
163. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § I 105(c)-(d)(1).
164. The Fed is unlikely to be able to satisfy those requirements with a section 13(3) direct
lending facility. Its lending will be constrained by the adequate collateralization requirements and the
nontraded character of a significant portion of bank assets. For its guarantees in 2008, the FDIC charged
a fee, but it did not require the pledge of collateral. Moreover, a direct Fed lending program that would
provide a partial substitute would result in a potentially vast expansion of the Fed's balance sheet and in
effect, another form of nationalization.
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financial crisis. However, if (when) miscalculations, mistakes in financial
regulation, or exogenous events produce financial instability, the
nationalization threat will increase the risk of financial crisis, a point we
develop below.
The nationalization threat, if consummated, leaves the government
owning and operating many firms in the financial sector for an undetermined
period of time, as long as five years. Dodd-Frank stipulates that the
"responsible" senior officers and directors of firms taken into receivership
should be immediately removed, and it subjects all employee contracts to
potential repudiation at any point in the receivership.16 5 It also subjects the
firm's financial contracts to repudiation.166 These actions will be applied across
the several firms taken into receivership. In our view, the likely disruption from
wide-ranging nationalization is a significant concern. The recent financial crisis
saw too much risk-taking ex ante and too many bailouts ex post, meaning, in
our terms, government assistance without sufficient compensation. But the
interventions by the Fed, the FDIC, and TARP produced a relatively stable
financial sector recovery. While not a cure for recession, financial sector
recovery is a minimum condition for economic recovery. Dodd-Frank is loaded
with regulatory empowerment to constrain excessive risk-taking by financial
firms and to monitor and mitigate systemic risks before they become
threatening. But as the FDIC itself has declared in its summary, "[n]o set of
laws, no matter how enlightened, can forestall the emergence of some new
financial crisis somewhere down the road. It is part of the nature of financial
markets, observed throughout history."' When Dodd-Frank's "command and
control" strategies fail, is financial sector nationalization really the best
recovery strategy?
The nationalization strategy and the acceleration of financial crisis. A
major downside of the nationalization strategy is that it is likely to accelerate
the slide from financial instability to financial crisis and thus increase the
incidence of financial crises. If nationalization is likely in periods of systemic
emergency, potential capital suppliers will see their entire investment in the
financial sector at risk, rather than just their investments in particular firms. The
freeze-up of financial markets following Lehman's failure offers insight into
investors' likely response to the threat of nationalization. Before the Lehman
failure, investors seemed to believe that particular firms were "too big to fail,"
or at least big enough that virtually all creditors, if not necessarily shareholders,
would be protected from losses. This assumption was reasonable in light of the
FDIC's historical resolution strategy for systemically important banks and the
165. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 210(c)(1), (7)(C).
166. Id § 210(c). The repudiation is subject to the obligee right to recover damages and
protections of specific collateral arrangements in "qualified financial contracts." Id. § 210(c)(3)(D),
(c)(8).
167. See FDIC's Role and Authorities Under the New Financial Reform Law, FED. DEPOSIT




recent merger, with Fed support, of Bear Stearns. Lehman was a shock to
creditor expectations because of the exposure of unsecured creditors to very
significant losses. The disorderly collapse of Lehman exacerbated systemic
distress, but the financial crisis arose from a different concern: that all firms
were at risk of insolvency and that many (or even all) of them could be
permitted to fail with severe creditor losses. Capital suppliers went on strike.
To mitigate the financial crisis, the government rushed to restore prior
expectations through the rescue of AIG and later Citigroup, the FDIC guarantee
of deposits and new debt, and the provision of capital support via TARP.
With this account in mind, consider two alternative resolution regimes.
The first proceeds by receivership of failing firms but preserves a "systemic
emergency" exception for financial sector support. The second is exclusively a
receivership regime, much like Dodd-Frank. If a particular financial firm fails
for idiosyncratic reasons (for example, a concentrated book of emerging market
loans that goes sour), and the resolution process itself does not create systemic
distress, a diversified capital supplier would maintain its financial sector
investments and willingly supply new capital to the sector. This outcome holds
under either resolution regime. But if a firm's failure has sufficient systemic
implications to produce financial instability, or if instability arises even without
a firm's failure, the outcomes under the two resolution regimes critically
diverge.
Under the first regime, the investor is willing to supply new capital to the
financial sector at a time of financial instability. If this "instability" does
become a "systemic emergency," the investor knows that even if one or more
firms are placed in receivership and a substantial loss of capital ensues, the
government will intervene to support the financial sector, meaning the many
remaining important firms. A diversification strategy can thus succeed. The
investor's losses on new investments are bounded, and investors can limit
losses by supplying debt rather than equity. Investors can also support the
strongest firms in the sector and price capital in light of firm-specific risk. The
availability of this new capital at a time of financial instability reduces the risk
of a slide into a financial crisis.
Under the second regime, the one created by Dodd-Frank, financial
instability renders the investor unwilling to supply new capital to the financial
sector as either debt or equity because a transition from "instability" to
"systemic emergency" would place the investor's entire investment at risk.1
The only potential government intervention, a receivership, would wipe out
168. This conclusion is implicitly conceded by the proponents of banking sector
nationalization in the last financial crisis. See, e.g., Matthew Richardson & Nouriel Roubini, To Shore
Up the Banks, Nationalize Them, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2009, at B3. Their proposed strategy was to test
firms for solvency, and then for the insolvent firms, to nationalize them simultaneously: "The
government should start with the big banks that have outside debt, and it should determine which are
solvent and which aren't in one fell swoop, to avoid panic. Otherwise, bringing down one big bank will
start an immediate run on the equity and long-term debt of the others." Id.
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equity and is likely to impose significant losses on unsecured creditors. The
amount of these losses would be uncertain. A quick FDIC liquidation may
result in firesale prices, meaning very large losses. A long receivership would
tie up investors' funds and expose creditors to a recoupment, or "clawback," of
payments made during the receivership if such payments are greater than the
claims entitlement in the final resolution of the firm.' 6 9 Under Dodd-Frank, the
receivership risk will not be limited to a single firm or a small number of firms.
In other words, diversification strategies fail. The only way a capital
supplier can protect itself against deep losses in the financial sector is not to
invest at all.170 But such behavior by capital suppliers will hasten the onset of
financial crisis because troubled firms will be unable to attract the capital
necessary to achieve stability. In other words, the Dodd-Frank strategy of
financial sector nationalization is likely to accelerate the path from instability to
a full-scale crisis. Indeed, the strategy is likely to increase the incidence of
financial crises, as occasions of instability that otherwise would have been
abated through private capital support will now slide into crisis.
This slide will be made more precipitous by prior legislation that stripped
the Treasury's authority to use the Exchange Stabilization Fund to guarantee
the obligations of MMFs. That strategy halted the run on MMFs following
the Reserve Fund's "breaking the buck" upon Lehman's default. In the absence
of a possible federal safety net, MMFs will act in highly self-protective ways
when faced with financial instability. Fearing a run themselves, MMFs will
withdraw from the wholesale short-term credit market, producing a run on the
many financial firms that rely on repos, commercial paper, and other short-term
credit. Receivership beckons. 172
The internationalization of financial crisis. Lehman's failure provides a
lesson in the unanticipated internationalization of financial crises from the
failure of a single U.S. firm. Multiple failures resolved via FDIC receivership
could have even greater effects. The disjuncture between U.S. and U.K.
bankruptcy regimes factored significantly in the systemic impact of Lehman's
failure. An FDIC receivership via Dodd-Frank raises unresolved questions in
the international setting. The FDIC can impose a receivership on subsidiaries
169. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 210(o)(1)(D).
170. Note that many unsecured creditors of financial firms are systemically important
themselves, including money MMFs and insurers, and thus will be under pressure to avoid potential
losses.
171. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L.No. 110-343, § 131(b), 122 Stat.
3765.
172. The FDIC could partially mitigate this risk by declaring in its Orderly Liquidation
Regulations that short-term credit at financial firms will be more favorably treated than other unsecured
debt. Of course, this comes perilously close to a guarantee of noninsured deposits and other short-term
debt. The FDIC's proposed implementation of resolution authority under Dodd-Frank suggests it would
treat short-term creditors (defined as securities that mature in 360 days or less) more favorably than
long-term creditors. See Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,181 (proposed Oct. 12,




that are "in default or in danger of default,"l73 but this authority does not seem
to extend to foreign subsidiaries.' 74 Moreover, U.S. law cannot preempt the
local law or bankruptcy law of a foreign state in which a particular subsidiary
has been organized. It may not be possible for the FDIC to mitigate
international fallout by avoiding a bankruptcy of the foreign subsidiary. Dodd-
Frank abrogates ipse dixit, or walkaway provisions, which give counterparties
the right to terminate financial contracts immediately upon the initiation of
insolvency or cognate proceedings (like a receivership) against the maker or
guarantor, even if the contracts have not been otherwise breached.17 Yet, if
such contracts are entered into by a foreign subsidiary and include a foreign
choice of law and forum provision, Dodd-Frank may be unable to prevent the
assertion of contract rights that would make the foreign subsidiary effectively
insolvent or otherwise unable to function.
The follow-on options are highly unattractive. For example, the FDIC
could borrow money from the Treasury to pay off these claims, downstreaming
payments through the U.S. parent. This option would entail a politically fraught
decision that U.S. taxpayers should pay foreign counterparties in full.
Alternatively, the FDIC could let the foreign subsidiary fall into bankruptcy,
which would significantly exacerbate contagion effects that the FDIC
receivership was intended to avoid. These troubles seem baked into the national
resolution of firms with an international footprint. The strategy of Dodd-Frank
is to tell the FDIC to coordinate "to the maximum extent possible" with foreign
financial authorities 76 and to commission two studies on transnational
coordination.177
But the international impact of an FDIC receivership for a single failing
financial firm will be magnified by a sequence of falling dominos, serial
receiverships, and financial firm nationalizations. The shock, uncertainty, and
disruption could easily trigger an international financial crisis. The actual scope
is of course speculative, but the consequences for the international financial
system may be severe. One goal of Dodd-Frank is to cast aside the belief that
some U.S. firms are "too big to fail." It takes no account of the fact that, in the
international realm, there are some firms that are "too big to save," meaning
that the size of a financial firm relative to the economy of its national domicile
deprives national regulators of the resources for an orderly liquidation, much
less a rescue. Multiple FDIC receiverships of U.S. firms could destabilize such
foreign firms. That Dodd-Frank allows regulators no discretion to manage such
173. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 210 (a)(I)(E)(i)(I).
174. The referenced subsidiaries must be organized under "Federal law or the laws of any
State." Id. § 210 (a)(1)(E)(i).
175. Id. § 210(c)(8)(F).
176. Id. § 210(a)(1)(N).
177. Id. § 202(f) (Comptroller General); id. § 217 (Federal and Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts).
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concerns has earned its approach to widespread systemic distress an apt label:
"the nuclear option."
B. The Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund
The challenges of forestalling and addressing a financial sector crisis
show why the Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund ("SEIF" or "Fund") is
necessary. Specific large-firm resolutions may exceed the FDIC's resources
under Dodd-Frank. The FDIC's receivership may impose significant losses
with systemic consequences because of unexpected impacts on systemically
important actors like MMFs and insurers. In a systemic emergency,
stabilization of the overall financial sector may be necessary. The mechanism
available under Dodd-Frank, receiverships imposed on multiple major financial
firms on a narrow timeframe, will be difficult to administer and will amount to
government nationalization of a large portion of the financial sector with
unpredictable consequences. Such a massive intervention is hardly the best way
to avoid the breakout of financial sector distress into the real economy.
Moreover, the threat of this strategy could accelerate the slide from financial
sector instability to financial sector crisis. An alternative approach would
require recourse to Congress for additional authority in the middle of a crisis.
This strategy is also likely to result in the breakout of the financial crisis into
the real economy.' Even worse, a legislative failure in the crucible of an
emergency would be a major blow to public confidence and a genuine
catastrophe for the real economy.
We propose creating standby emergency authority scaled to the size of the
current U.S. economy: $1 trillion, in 2010 dollars. As of the end of 2009, the
U.S. GDP was approximately $14 trillion, 179 total credit market debt was
approximately $53 trillion,'80 and total financial assets were approximately
$145 trillion.' 8 ' In the recent crisis, Congress granted $700 billion of authority
through TARP. All of it was taken down, and at the worst moments, it still
seemed insufficient.' 82 The funding we propose for SEIF would amount to
approximately 7% of GDP and 2% of the current credit market debt, perhaps
178. The evidence for this proposition in the fall of 2008 is assessed in Gordon & Muller,
supra note 77.
179. NATIONAL ECONOMIC AccouNTs, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
available at http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp (last visited Dec. 4, 2010).
180. Id. at tbl.L.4.
181. See supra note 20, at tbl.L.5.
182. In addition to being calibrated for political feasibility and psychological effect, TARP's
$700 billion was scaled to 5% of the $14 trillion then-outstanding residential and commercial mortgages
(5% approximating the relevant loss rate) and 6.3% of U.S. commercial bank assets (then $11 trillion).
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the best measure of financial sector size. 183 It is important that this standby
authority be scaled to the growth of the U.S. economy, proxied for these
purposes by growth of the total credit market debt.
Use of SEIF would be permitted only by a consensus determination by the
Treasury, the Fed, and the FDIC that systemic financial distress exists, that it
cannot be adequately addressed by the use of nonemergency authority
(including the FDIC's receivership power), and that it threatens to severely
disrupt the U.S. economy.184 SEIF would be available for three purposes. First,
it could provide support to the FDIC's resolution plans and other FDIC-
permitted activity. Second, it could provide capital and other assistance to firms
in the financial sector. And third, it could support emergency authority wielded
by the Federal Reserve by, for example, backstopping liquidity or asset
financing programs exemplified by the Fed's financing activity in the recent
financial crisis and permitted by Dodd-Frank.
To make SEIF a credible emergency funding source and to make clear its
function as an insurance fund as opposed to a taxpayer bailout, it should be
partially pre-funded by an assessment on large financial firms, including
private financial firms such as hedge funds and MMFs, who depend on the
stability of the financial sector for their daily activity.'8 5 The analogy, of
course, is to the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund, which aims to protect the
banking system against systemic risk. Protecting depositors is mostly incidental
to that objective. With the growth of nonbank financial intermediaries in the
"shadow banking" system, we need to broaden the Deposit Insurance Fund
concept.
A quarter of SEIF should be pre-funded-$250 billion in 2010 dollars,
indexed appropriately. The financial sector assessments should be set such that
the fund will accumulate slowly over time. We would favor a 20-year
183. The approximately $1 trillion Eurozone bailout amounts to 6.2% of Eurozone GDP
($16.2 trillion). See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2010). It
was scaled to roughly 22% of the combined GDPs of Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain, with $146
billion committed to Greece alone-about 41% of its GDP. See Dan Bilefsky & Landon Thomas Jr.,
Greece Takes Its Bailout, But Doubts for the Region Persist, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, at B.
In further comparison, the Swedish, Finnish, and Norweigan responses to the Nordic banking
crises of the early 1990s were scaled to between 2% and 9% of GDP. Peter Englund, The Swedish
Banking Crisis, 15 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 80, 94 (1999); Knut Sandal, The Nordic Banking Crises
in the Early 1990s-Resolution Methods and Fiscal Costs 104 tbl.3, in THE NORWEGIAN BANKING
CRISIS, NORGES BANKS SKRIFTSERIE (T.G. More, J.A. Solheim, & B. Vale eds., 2004), available at
http://www.norges-bank.no/upload/import/publikasjoner/skriftserie/33/chapter3.pdf; Seppo Honkapohja,
The 1990's Financial Crises in Nordic Countries 24 tbl.4.1 (Bank of Fin. Research, Discussion Paper
No. 5/2009, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--1427260.
184. Alternatively, such an emergency could be invoked by super-majority vote of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council. We also favor reinstating the FDIC's loan guarantee authority
upon the same regulatory approval triggers that pertain to SEIF, subject to the provision of a loan
guarantee fee and the obtaining of warrants.
185. We are open to the suggestion that premiums should also come from other major credit-
market participants like bond funds and insurance companies with asset levels above the threshold
applied to hedge funds and MMFs.
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accumulation period, which would balance the 75-year period since the last
major systemic break, the Great Depression, against increased instability from
globalizing finance. The assessments should be risk-adjusted, requiring
regulators to determine which firm-specific factors add to the systemic risk
load, including presumably both capital and liquidity.186 The assessments
should continue after the initial fund is accumulated, so that relative risk
adjustments can be made; for example, a firm that lowers its risk may receive a
refund of more than it pays in for a particular period.'87 Borrowing from the
Treasury should support a SEIF drawdown of more than the accumulated fund.
Any losses to the Treasury should be covered by an assessment on all parties
who are liable for pre-funding assessments. Apart from removing the
unfairness of a taxpayer bailout, this mutualization of losses in a systemic
emergency will give financial sector participants an incentive to alert regulators
to growing systemic risks.
In short, the mechanism we propose requires large financial firms to
mutually self-insure against outbreaks of systemic distress and gives regulators
the power to structure their interventions.
III. Responding to Objections
SEIF would empower regulators, especially the Treasury, to make large-
scale emergency interventions to protect the financial system in times of
financial distress without additional congressional authorization and without
the need to nationalize the financial sector. Most objections about legitimacy
and accountability can be addressed with an appropriate funding source, a
cautious trigger mechanism, and ex post accountability mechanisms. SEIF is a
complement to, not a substitute for, the stringent ex ante risk-regulation regime
of Dodd-Frank. It is also consistent with taxes or other fees to compensate the
government when the combination of receivership and assistance create
unusual profit opportunities for the surviving firms. As noted above, we
propose that financial firms, not taxpayers, fund (and pre-fund) the insurance
facility, that its use be made subject to a "triple key" regulatory concurrence,
and that its application be monitored via safeguards similar to those found in
Dodd-Frank, which are triggered by the FDIC's invocation of its emergency
receivership powers. The relevant congressional committees will presumably
186. Dodd-Frank requires risk-based assessments on large financial companies (greater than
$50 billion in assets) pursuant to a risk matrix established by the regulators that takes account of "the
risks presented by the financial company to the financial system and the extent to which the financial
company has benefited, or likely would benefit, from the orderly liquidation of a financial company,"
identifying various factors that should be included in the calculus. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210(o)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1464. This
provides a useful starting point for SEIF assessments. Scaling risk assessment to changing perceptions
of systemic risk is particularly challenging.
187. The Fund should be invested in long-term Treasury securities, and accrued interest




undertake oversight hearings to dissect the cause of the systemic emergency
and the Treasury's (and other regulators') use of SEIF and other emergency
powers.
There are three sorts of objections to our proposal that we think require
special attention: first, that SEIF protection of the financial system is likely to
hold harmless the firms and even the well-compensated individuals whose
actions may have precipitated the crisis, in effect, rewarding the undeserving;
second, that the Fund's existence will exacerbate the "too big to fail"
perception that results in poor financial discipline at such firms, a "micro moral
hazard" problem; and third, that the Fund itself will encourage greater risk-
taking by firms, investors, and regulators, increasing the risk of systemic
distress, a "macro moral hazard" problem.
A. Rewarding the Undeserving?
The first objection, a kind of unjust enrichment claim against apparently
undeserving beneficiaries, is a major source of the political backlash against the
TARP program. Such a stance, grounded in an understandable desire to punish
the relevant actors, falls short, however. Most of the punishment from
unchecked economic distress will be absorbed not by Wall Street but by Main
Street and the millions who lose their jobs. Even with TARP (and a major
economic stimulus program), unemployment has almost reached 10%,188 and
seven million workers have lost jobs since September 2008."9 Without the
stabilization of the financial sector that TARP made possible, these losses
would have been vastly greater.190 To some extent, the visceral fairness
objection should be mitigated by the use of an industry-supported (and partially
pre-funded) "insurance fund" instead of a taxpayer supported program like
TARP. For example, during the recent financial crisis, the FDIC resisted
drawing on its line of credit at the Treasury to support its dwindling Deposit
Insurance Fund precisely to avoid the unfavorable perception of taxpayer
funding. Additionally, a Fund recipient should provide the Treasury with an
equity kicker on its repayment and accept stringent executive compensation
terms. There is also no principled objection to setting up an excise tax on the
188. Employment Situation Summary, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, available at
http://www.bis.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm (comparing January 2010 unemployment (9.7%) with
December 2009) (last updated Feb. 5, 2010).
189. Current Employment Statistics, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, at tbl.B-1, available at
http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cesbtabl.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2010) (check "Total
nonfarm"/"Seasonally adjusted" and click "Retrieve data") (comparing employees on nonfarm payrolls
as of September 2008 against December 2009, seasonally adjusted). An alternative measure is
unemployment, which shows an increase of approximately 6 million over the period. See Labor Force
Statistics, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, at tbl.A-10, available at
http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatabl0.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2010) (check "Total, 16 years
and over"/"Number of unemployed persons" and click "Retrieve data") (comparing number of
unemployed as of September 2008 against December 2009).
190. See Blinder & Zandi, supra note 3.
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financial firm beneficiaries that have survived and prospered as a result of an
intervention. But the key point cannot be lost: the alternative to an emergency
intervention that may save some unworthy financial firms and individuals is a
systemic break with potentially devastating spillover effects on the real
economy and the lives of most citizens.
B. Increasing the "Too Big to Fail" Problem?
Another likely objection is that an emergency facility like SEIF will
encourage the growth of firms that are "too big to fail." This concern stems
from the FDIC's historical practice of trying to rescue rather than liquidate
large banks that run into financial distress and the consequent protection of
even noninsured depositors.191 This practice has several interrelated
distortionary consequences. Firms that are "too big to fail" are not subject to
normal financial discipline and may engage in excessive risk-taking-moral
hazard at the firm level or "micro moral hazard." Such firms have a cost-of-
capital advantage over smaller firms that the FDIC routinely liquidates. Indeed,
firms have incentives to grow, even beyond their effective management
capacity, to obtain "too big to fail" protection. If all large firms are protected
and are in competition, funds will disproportionately flow to the largest firms
with higher risks and higher returns from banking activity. The consequence is
greater risk throughout the financial sector.
The Dodd-Frank legislation seeks to break that linkage, and our proposal
would advance this objective. Under Dodd-Frank, an FDIC receivership of a
nonbank financial firm (including a bank holding company parent of an insured
depository institution) would apply a liquidation model, not a rescue model,
thus rejecting the "too big to fail" approach. Our proposal makes the liquidation
threat more credible. Imposing a receivership on a large financial firm is
destabilizing. As argued above, the specter of financial sector nationalization
could well accelerate the course to financial crisis. SEIF's availability should
reduce regulators' concern that imposing an FDIC receivership is itself too
dangerous. Market actors will know that the Treasury has a backup should
resolution of a systemically important firm cause unanticipated systemic
distress. This should bound any adverse market response. The consequence is
to facilitate the imposition of an FDIC receivership and to make it easier for the
FDIC to follow through on threats to impose significant creditor losses. Thus,
the availability of SEIF can help reduce micro-moral hazard.
C. Increasing Risk-Taking Generally?
The third objection is that the availability of a standby emergency facility
will increase risk-taking by investors, firms, and regulators and thus increase




the frequency and severity of systemic distress. Investors (including creditors)
will know that even if any particular financial firm fails and is liquidated
through an FDIC receivership, other firms may be protected in a systemic
emergency. Thus, diversification is the indicated investment strategy. But
investors are still looking for the highest return. Firms could face shareholder
pressure to adopt higher-risk/higher-return strategies in return for funds. Even
if a firm is not "too big to fail," a medium-sized firm (Bear Steams or Lehman)
or a small firm (Long Term Capital Management) can cause great financial
system distress by failing. The further concern is that regulators, aware of their
backup capacity to address a systemic emergency, may draw initial constraints
less tightly or respond to increasing levels of systemic risk less vigorously.
These causal chains assume that investors would expect regulators facing
systemic distress to turn to SEIF in a predictable way. One strong counter to
this objection is the Fed's invocation of its emergency authority under section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, the basis for many of its actions during the
recent financial crisis. Until 2008, this power had been unused for seventy
years. 192 Among other considerations, the Fed has been concerned that
declaring a financial emergency would create one. It is hard to believe that
financial firms modified their risk parameters in expectation that the Fed would
bail out the world financial system in a pinch. Indeed, the history suggests that
the Fed has, if anything, been too reluctant to use its emergency authority-or
that at least Congress has (at least at times) thought so. In the stock market
crash of 1987, several key Wall Street broker-dealers teetered on the brink of
failure. The Fed supplied some liquidity support, but it did so only by lending
to member banks for follow-on loans to the broker-dealers, an awkward
arrangement. In the aftermath of this brush with major systemic distress, the
1991 amendments to FDICIA significantly expanded the Fed's authority to
lend to nonbank financial firms by expanding the range of eligible collateral.19 3
The Senate committee report (and Senator Dodd's separate remarks) in the
wake of the 1987 crisis were clear about the desirability of Fed intervention to
avoid financial market collapse.1 94
192. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 77.
193. Id. at 33; see Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-242, § 473, 105 Stat. 2236, 2386.
194. S. REP. No. 102-167 (1991); 137 CONG. REc. 36, 131-32 (statement of Sen. Christopher
Dodd). The Committee Report states:
[The provision] therefore amends the Federal Reserve Act to allow stocks, bonds and other
securities to be used for discount advances by borrowers other than member banks. This
clarifies that access to liquidity in special circumstances can be made available directly to a
securities dealer to help preserve market liquidity and avoid market disruption. The borrowers
must still demonstrate their inability to obtain credit elsewhere and the instruments must still
be secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Bank. With the increasing
interdependence of our financial markets, it is essential that the Federal Reserve System have
authority and flexibility to respond promptly and effectively in unusual and exigent
circumstances that might disrupt the financial system and markets.
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Moreover, it has become clear that invoking emergency authority to
protect financial system actors who may have contributed to a crisis will be
controversial. Using industry-funded insurance rather than taxpayer dollars will
not remove the controversy, nor should it. Regulators will face close scrutiny
from Congress and the media. The lesson learned in the recent crisis about
political fallout will make regulators hesitant to use emergency power. This
lesson also undercuts the claim that standby emergency authority will
materially increase systemic risk. There is no doubt that specific firms, perhaps
several firms, will face receivership in the next financial crisis.
But in any event, this general objection runs up against the inevitability of
systemic distress. Dodd-Frank contains various measures to reduce systemic
risk, including enhanced capital and liquidity requirements, increased
supervisory oversight, structural changes to the industry, and ongoing systemic
risk monitoring. The interaction of these legislative and regulatory efforts with
dynamic global financial markets, over the span of decades, is impossible to
foresee. The availability of standby emergency authority does not itself make
firms "too big (or too connected) to fail." Rather, it is a prudential measure
against possibilities we may not project, notwithstanding efforts to avoid them,
and it is no more causative of failure than a safety net under a tightrope walker.
Indeed, by replenishing itself with assessments on all significant financial
firms, SEIF amounts to a mutualization of risk that should encourage more
cautious firms to press regulators to rein in firms and practices that pose
systemic risks.1 9 5
But suppose "macro" moral hazard will marginally increase the risk of a
systemic crisis under SEIF. Suppose, for example, creditors supply credit to
financial firms thinking that although a loan to any single firm may be lost,
government intervention through SEIF will provide protection against severe
losses from a generalized collapse. This action may marginally lower the cost
of capital to risk-taking firms, but even this cloud has a silver lining. Creditors
will be less likely to retreat at the hint of a crisis; financial firms may have a
better chance of raising capital that will stabilize them and the financial system
too. Is this a net negative? Standby authority to intervene in a systemic
financial emergency may be seen as a kind of generalized government
guarantee designed to avoid a run on the entire financial system. Government
protection against the outbreak of a Hobbesian state of nature in the financial
world is surely one useful way that government promotes the "common
195. It has become common for regulators to distinguish between "micro-prudential"
supervision and "macro-prudential" supervision, reflecting the differences between firm-specific risks of
failure and systemic risks. The regulators' distinction helps to illustrate why the control of "micro"
moral hazard, the "too big to fail" problem, does not protect against systemic breakdowns, in part




welfare" and fosters economic development.196 SEIF is a particularly attractive
vehicle to accomplish this objective.
Conclusion
The core argument for establishing SEIF is, in the end, simple. Despite
regulators' diligence and effectiveness at managing systemic risk, serious
systemic crises in the financial sector are inevitable if unpredictable.
Recognizing this does not take away from the urgency of present efforts to
restructure the financial sector and its regulations. In this moment of financial
regulatory reform, we need to preserve and improve regulators' authority to
intervene in an emergency. Even successful mid-crisis recourse to Congress
increases instability, and a legislative breakdown could produce true
catastrophe. The real economy and the lives of real people would bear the
costs. Between financial sector nationalization and SEIF, we think industry-
funded insurance is the better approach.
211
196. For a reconstruction of the alternative view, see J. Bradford DeLong, "Liquidation"
Cycles: Old-Fashioned Real Business Cycle Theory and the Great Depression (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. w3456, 1990), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract--226835.

